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Abstract
Men and women have distinct marriage patterns over the lifecycle. In the contemporary USA, marriages for
women are concentrated earlier in the lifecycle, whereas for men they are spread out later in the lifecycle. In
particular, this means that men are more likely than women to get married in middle age and beyond. This
difference is especially pronounced for remarriages — men are far more likely than women to remarry after
the age of 30. As a result, there are far more single women than single men over the age of 40. This difference
in remarriage patterns cannot be explained by the presence of children — in fact, among divorced women,
those with children are more likely to remarry than those without. I investigate how the gains from marriage
change over the lifecycle for men and women to understand whether these observed marriage patterns are
driven by changes in the value of marriage, as opposed to being products of equilibrium sorting. I develop an
equilibrium search and matching model that incorporates an aging process. This allows the model to capture
both the lifecycle dynamics of marriage and divorce decisions as well as the impact of local population
supplies on equilibrium matching outcomes. Using data from a large cross-sectional survey of the USA, I
structurally estimate the model for 20 large city-level marriage markets. I recover an estimate of the gains from
marriage, represented by a marital production function, in terms of the ages of husbands and wives. I find that
marital output drops off twice as steeply with respect to female age, compared to male age. This suggests that
women remarry less because the benefits are smaller, not just because of reduced availability of single men.
Finally, I estimate a model in which people are characterized by their education and race in order to capture
assortative mating along these dimensions. The results concerning age do not qualitatively change. I find large
differences in marital output based on college attainment, but not race.
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ABSTRACT
AGING AND THE GAINS FROM MARRIAGE
Toban Wiebe
Petra Todd
Men and women have distinct marriage patterns over the lifecycle. In the contemporary
USA, marriages for women are concentrated earlier in the lifecycle, whereas for men they
are spread out later in the lifecycle. In particular, this means that men are more likely than
women to get married in middle age and beyond. This difference is especially pronounced
for remarriages — men are far more likely than women to remarry after the age of 30.
As a result, there are far more single women than single men over the age of 40. This
difference in remarriage patterns cannot be explained by the presence of children — in fact,
among divorced women, those with children are more likely to remarry than those without.
I investigate how the gains from marriage change over the lifecycle for men and women to
understand whether these observed marriage patterns are driven by changes in the value
of marriage, as opposed to being products of equilibrium sorting. I develop an equilibrium
search and matching model that incorporates an aging process. This allows the model to
capture both the lifecycle dynamics of marriage and divorce decisions as well as the impact
of local population supplies on equilibrium matching outcomes. Using data from a large
cross-sectional survey of the USA, I structurally estimate the model for 20 large city-level
marriage markets. I recover an estimate of the gains from marriage, represented by a marital
production function, in terms of the ages of husbands and wives. I find that marital output
drops off twice as steeply with respect to female age, compared to male age. This suggests
that women remarry less because the benefits are smaller, not just because of reduced
availability of single men. Finally, I estimate a model in which people are characterized
by their education and race in order to capture assortative mating along these dimensions.
The results concerning age do not qualitatively change. I find large differences in marital
output based on college attainment, but not race.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Male and female marriage rates follow distinct patterns over the lifecycle. In the contempo-
rary USA, female marriage rates are higher below the age of 30, above which male marriage
rates dominate. The higher male marriage rate at later ages is in large part due to a much
higher male remarriage rate (as remarriages account for larger shares of all marriages at
later ages).
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Figure 1.1: Marriage rate gap by age
Figure 1.1 shows the annual marriage rates of women and men at each age. Female
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marriage rates rise earlier and peak at age 28. Male marriage rates rise later and peak
around age 30 — the peak is lower but drops off more slowly, so that by their mid-30s, men
have substantially higher marriage rates. This pattern of earlier female marriage is broadly
explained by differential fecundity:1 the female biological clock ticks faster, so women have
stronger incentives to marry earlier. Insofar as part of the value of marriage comes from
raising children, a woman’s value as a partner is tied to her fecundity. Low (2015) calls this
“reproductive capital”, as the potential to bear children can be thought of as a depreciating
economic asset. She uses an online dating experiment to estimate the “price” of fecundity,
finding that men value an extra year of fecundity on par with an additional $7,000 of annual
income from a prospective partner.
As men are effectively not bound by this reproductive constraint,2 they can afford to
wait longer before marriage, taking extra time to search for a better match and also to
accumulate resources that will improve their standing in the marriage market. Whether
differential fecundity alone explains this difference or not,3 it is clear that aging affects
women and men differently on the marriage market. I refer to this phenomenon more
generally as “differential aging”.4
In this paper, I abstract away from the specific mechanisms underlying differential aging
and instead focus on quantifying the value of marriage in terms of the ages of the husband
and wife. This provides insights into how age, as an individual characteristic, affects mar-
riage and divorce patterns for men and women over the lifecycle. In particular, I estimate
the gains from marriage as a function of both spouses’ ages in order to understand the sex
1The term fecundity refers to reproductive potential whereas fertility refers to realizations of that poten-
tial, although in the common usage fertility also refers to reproductive potential. Siow (1998) shows how
differential fecundity can account for many of the observed sex differences in marriage and labor, including
marriage timing and the spousal age gap.
2Male fecundity also declines with age, but much more slowly. Men are able to father children well beyond
the age of female menopause.
3A complementary interpretation of the differential fecundity mechanism is that men care about fecundity
indirectly via its correlation with youth and hence beauty. This is because mating preferences (i.e., the sense
of beauty) would have been shaped by strong evolutionary pressures to favor fecund mates.
4Differential aging could also arise for reasons other than fecundity. For example, it may be the case
that men mature later in terms of their suitability for marriage and fatherhood. This could be due to their
psychological disposition and/or to their ability to earn to support a family. These factors would affect a
man’s marriageability in the same sense that fecundity affects a woman’s.
2
differences in marriage patterns seen in Figure 1.1.
The distribution of marriages and of singles provides evidence about the gains from
marriage for each age or type pair. One may reason that, by revealed preference, more
common pairings produce greater marriage gains and vice versa. For example, most married
couples are of similar ages, which suggests that the value of marriage is greatly reduced
when there is a large age difference. However, this mode of inference will be confounded
by equilibrium sorting in the marriage market. As a one-to-one matching setting, the
equilibrium of a marriage market follows a supply-and-demand logic.5 A sex ratio imbalance
will improve the matching outcomes for the sex in short supply, whereas the opposite sex will
face greater competition and some will be excluded from matching at all. Thus, equilibrium
sorting will affect the matching outcome in ways that do not reflect the underlying gains from
marriage. Observed matching outcomes reflect both preferences and equilibrium sorting.
For instance, the fact that husbands are typically slightly older than their wives does not
necessarily imply that such marriages are more productive than same-age marriages or
marriages in which wives are older than husbands. Instead, it could just be the result of a
relative scarcity of marriageable younger men, resulting in a matching equilibrium in which
women marry up in age.
Although males and females are born in roughly equal numbers, the relative population
supplies of men and women in local marriage markets can vary due to migration, mortality,
and incarceration. Taking social groups into consideration, there are even more ways that
the relevant sex ratios might vary. Table 1.1 shows the extent to which marriages are
homogamous with respect to education and race.6 For example, among those who are
married, 66.4% of college-educated women and 77.4% of college-educated men have a college-
educated spouse — under random matching, these numbers would be 36.4% and 42.5%,
5This is easily seen in matching models such as Gale and Shapley (1962), Becker (1973), or Shimer and
Smith (2000). A number of papers have empirically studied the impact of sex ratio imbalances on marriage
outcomes. For example, Angrist (2002) and Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011) both find large
effects on marriage probabilities, consistent with the predictions of matching models.
6Greenwood et al. (2014) documents rising levels of positive assortative mating with respect to education
since the 1970s. Regarding low interracial marriage rates, Wong (2003b) investigates whether social norms
have been a deterrent, and Shin (2014) examines the extent to which limited meeting opportunities can
account for the shortfall.
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Group Women Men
Non-college 85.2% (63.6%) 77.8% (57.5%)
College 66.4% (36.4%) 77.4% (42.5%)
White 97.1% (91.8%) 97.1% (92.1%)
Black 88.5% (8.2%) 77.1% (7.9%)
Notes: Values are computed as the percentage of women/men in homogamous mar-
riages out of all married women/men in the given group. The hypothetical values un-
der random matching are shown in parentheses. The basis is calculated separately for
women and men. To calculate the values for women, the basis is all marriages in which
the wife is at most 40 years old, and for men, the basis is all marriages in which the
husband is at most 42 years old. ACS 2008–2016.
Table 1.1: Homogamous marriage rates versus random matching baseline
respectively. If these high levels of assortative matching reflect marital preferences, then
the sex ratios within these groupings become important factors in the equilibrium outcome.
It is well known that women complete college at higher rates than men.7 This means that
college-educated women face a shortage of similarly-educated men. To the extent that
they prefer to marry college-educated men, this worsens their opportunities in the marriage
market.
1.1 Marriage market models
In order to account for equilibrium sorting, I estimate an equilibrium matching model in
order to infer the gains from marriage over the lifecycle. There are two main classes of
empirical marriage market frameworks that are used to estimate the gains from marriage:
(1) the static matching framework of Choo and Siow (2006), and (2) the search and matching
framework of Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) which is based upon the model of
Shimer and Smith (2000).8 In the static matching framework, the solution concept is that of
7Women have completed college in greater number than men since the 1980s. Bronson (2015) reports
that women now make up 58% of college graduates. She argues that, as divorce rates jumped in the 1970s,
women sought college degrees as a form of insurance against very low income in the event of divorce.
8Shimer and Smith (2000) is the canonical search and matching model with transferable utility. It is a
model of one-to-one matching and can be applied to two-sided matching markets, such as marriage and job
search.
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stable matchings, and there is no notion of time. The matching model elegantly incorporates
the multinomial logit choice structure,9 which yields a simple closed-form expression to
non-parametrically estimate the gains from marriage.10 In the search framework, agents
face search frictions and so it takes time to find a partner. The solution concept is that
of stationary (i.e., steady-state) equilibrium.11 Both frameworks assume large markets
(continuous populations) to avoid problems of discreteness.
These two frameworks share a fundamental similarity in that they both assume trans-
ferable utility within marriage in order to non-parametrically identify the underlying gains
from marriage — the extra utility generated within marriage relative to being single. As
Choo and Siow (2006) explain in their Introduction, transferable utility is the key assump-
tion that allows for the non-parametric identification of the gains from marriage. This is
because transferable utility obviates the need to estimate separate marital preferences for
each sex, as it suffices to estimate the joint marital output.12 For example, in a model with
I types of men and J types of women, there are I × J possible type pairs, and so each
sex has potentially I × J match preference parameters. If the researcher only observes the
number of singles and pairs of each type, this provides I + J + I × J observations, which
for I, J > 2 is strictly less than 2× I × J , the number of potential preferences parameters.
Thus, identifying assumptions are necessary for any empirical matching model. With the
assumption of transferable utility, there are at most I × J parameters describing the joint
marital output, and so it can be identified. With non-transferable utility, other identify-
9Galichon and Salanié (2015) generalize the model beyond the multinomial logit structure, which imposes
restrictive substitution patterns. The generalized model can accomodate more realistic distributions of
unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., correlations in unobserved preferences over different types.
10In the static matching framework, men and women are characterized by types. Preferences over potential
matches (i.e., opposite-sex types) are represented by two additive components: a systematic component
common to everyone of that type, and an idiosyncratic component that is modeled as a random preference
shock.
11In the search and matching framework, men and women may also be characterized by types. Further-
more, married couples may separate and return to the pool of singles. Preferences over potential matches
are derived from a marital production function, which is defined over types, and an additive idiosyncratic
match-specific bliss shock that is realized upon meeting. Thus, as with the static matching case, match pref-
erences are determined by a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component.
12Under transferable utility, couples behave as a single decision-maker, and so each couple aims to maximize
the joint marital output. This also means that stable matchings maximize the sum of marital output in the
society.
5
ing assumptions would be required in order to estimate separate preferences for each sex.
Typically, parametric restrictions are imposed on the utility functions.
In both frameworks, the gains from marriage are represented by a marital production
function whose output is divided between the two spouses.13 As a model primitive, it cap-
tures the fundamental gains from marriage, independent of the particular marriage market
equilibrium. Another convenience provided by the transferable utility assumption is that
the reduced form of the models does not include equilibrium transfers (i.e., prices). As a
result, both frameworks allow for estimation without requiring a full solution of the model,
and so they are relatively simple to implement.14 By assuming that the data come from
a matching equilibrium (a stable matching or a stationary equilibrium), these models are
identified from a single cross-section of the population. The static model requires only the
population stocks of marriages and singles, whereas the search model additionally requires
the corresponding flows into and out of marriage.15
To study lifecycle marriage patterns, it is crucial that the model be dynamic and in-
corporate an aging process so that agents optimize over the lifecycle. The incorporation of
lifecycle dynamics into the static matching framework of Choo and Siow (2006) has been
made by Choo (2015), who embeds the static matching model into a discrete choice dynamic
programming framework. In this overlapping-generations model, a frictionless marriage
market clears in each period, with those who opted to remain single going on to participate
in the marriage market in the next period. Men and women are characterized by their age,
13In the static matching framework, the output is divided according to the supply and demand for spouses
on the marriage market, with transfers being analogous to market prices. In particular, the equilibrium
prices clear the market and there is no surplus to bargain over. In the search framework, by contrast, search
frictions give rise to bilateral rents, as it takes time to find potential matches. As such there is scope for
bargaining over the resulting surplus. The convention in the literature, e.g., Shimer and Smith (2000), is to
divide the surplus according to Nash bargaining, with the outside options of being single and searching as
threatpoints.
14Non-transferable utility models can be used to parametrically estimate marital preferences, but they
require that the model be solved in order to be estimated. In practice, solving for an equilibrium must be
done numerically. Wong (2003a) estimates a search model with non-transferable utility, based on the model
of Burdett and Coles (1997). Coles and Francesconi (2017) generalizes the search framework to a collective
household model that nests the special cases of transferable and non-transferable utility.
15Flows can be obtained from cross-sectional datasets with information on whether the respondents entered
or exited marriages during the past year. Search models are often estimated from panel data using a
durations-based maximum likelihood estimator (e.g., Goussé (2014), Shin (2014), and Wong (2003a)), but
this severely restricts sample sizes as compared to using cross-sectional datasets.
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which increases in each period. To replenish the population as it ages, a new generation of
young people enters the marriage market in each period. The model assumes a stationary
equilibrium in order to identify the gains from marriage by age. As with the model of Choo
and Siow (2006), it can be estimated without needing to solve the model, and can still be
identified from just the population stocks of singles and couples by age. However, rather
than adopting this model, I opt instead for a search model, which additionally incorporates
information on population flows into and out of marriage.
For the purpose of estimating the gains from marriage over the lifecycle, the search
framework provides several distinct advantages. Most importantly, it can parsimoniously
accomodate an endogenous divorce process.16 By contrast, Choo (2015) models divorce as
an exogenous shock, acknowledging that “[a] cost of this approach is that the model has
nothing to say about the division of within-marriage surplus over the life-cycle”. Related to
this, the estimated gains from marriage have a slightly different interpretation: in my search
model, the marital production function represents a flow of output (gains from marriage)
at specific ages, and so it changes over the lifecycle as the couple ages; for Choo, the
marriage gains represent the discounted present value of the utility from entering into a
marriage today. Estimating the age-specific flow utility enables me to see how the gains
from marriage change over the course of a marriage. This is of course very important for
understanding divorce and remarriage choices. Finally, Choo (2015) studies how marriage
gains changed between 1970 and 1990 and how a static model underestimates the gains for
the young, whereas I use recent data to study sex differences in the gains from marriage
and how they change over the lifecycle.
Beyond Choo (2015), a few other papers have incorporated an aging process into empiri-
cal equilibrium marriage market models, though these do not provide for the non-parametric
estimation of the marriage gains as with the two frameworks discussed above. Instead, they
estimate preference parameters by means of the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). In
16I follow the approach of Goussé (2014), who developed the endogenous divorce process by introducing
periodically updating match quality shocks, which may trigger a decision to separate. With transferable
utility, there is no need to make any assumption about commitment in marriage, as couples choose to marry
or divorce if and only if the decision is mutually beneficial.
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a related paper, Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka (2016) employ a simple stochastic aging pro-
cess in a discrete-time search model of marriage in order to study the effects of sex ratios on
marriage patterns. They fit the model to 1950 data and show that sex ratio effects on equi-
librium sorting can account for much of the changes in marriage patterns since 1850. They
estimate preference parameters over spousal age (utility is non-transferable) as well as pa-
rameters governing the rate at which each sex matures, capturing the notion of differential
aging. Their results are supportive of the differential aging hypothesis: the parameter esti-
mates suggest that women mature earlier than men, but that men remain attractive in the
marriage market for a longer portion of their lives.
Dı́az-Giménez and Giolito (2013) explicitly model differential fecundity in a discrete-time
search model by basing the gains from marriage partly on having children and calibrating
the lifecycle fecundity profiles of men and women according to estimates from the medical
literature. They find that the age gap in marriage can be explained by differential fecundity,
but not by sex differences in income as has traditionally been proposed. Bronson and
Mazzocco (2018) incorporate a simple differential aging mechanism into their discrete-time
search model by imposing the restriction that women can only marry when young, whereas
men can marry when young or old. They use the model to show how changes in marriage
patterns over time can be explained by a combination of differential aging and sex ratio
effects. Finally, Coles and Francesconi (2011) incorporate continuous aging into a search
model and provides theoretical results showing that “toyboy” marriages — between younger,
poorer men and older, richer women — can arise as an exchange of youth for wealth.
Unfortunately, using a continuous aging process makes it much harder to solve the model
(see Appendix E for a discussion of the difficulties that arise).
1.2 Estimating the gains from marriage over the lifecycle
I use the framework of Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) to develop a search model
that incorporates an aging process in order to estimate the gains from marriage in terms
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of the ages of each spouse.17 I derive results for solving, estimating, and numerically simu-
lating the model. The model also features multidimensional types (in addition to age) and
differential mortality by sex, age, and type.
As marriage markets are circumscribed more closely to the city level than to the nation
or even state level, I define marriage markets at the level of the Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA). The definition of an MSA is intended to capture the notion of an economic
region around a city, as measured by commuting and employment. This is also a fitting
geographical delineation of a marriage market. To my knowledge, no other paper estimates
a marriage market model at a plausible geographic scale — typically, sample size constraints
require that marriage markets be defined at the national level.18
As each marriage market has its own equilibrium, aggregating markets to a larger ge-
ographic area such as a country comes at the price of losing the heterogeneity of local
markets.19 This is a serious practical concern, as sorting of men and women between cities
can result in large differences in local sex ratios across marriage markets, even if the global
sex ratio is balanced. For instance, the clustering of industries into particular cities can re-
sult in local labor markets with imbalanced sex ratios. New York City is a major fashion
industry hub that employs many women, whereas Silicon Valley is a major technology in-
dustry hub that employs many men. It is obvious even to the casual observer that these
two places have very different marriage markets. Moreover, rural industries such as farming
and petroleum primarily employ men.
I treat local marriage markets as isolated from one another, each with its own equilib-
rium. However, I assume common model primitives which I estimate by using data from
17The framework is presented in its essential form in Goussé (2014), who applies the model to study
marriage patterns in terms of wealth and beauty by estimating their contributions to the marital production
function for each sex. I provide an outline of the model in Appendix D.
18An exception is Gayle and Shephard (2018), who recognize the value of defining marriage markets more
locally. They estimate a marriage matching model at the Census Bureau division level (the US is partitioned
into 9 such divisions). They note: “We do not use a finer level of market disaggregation due to sample size
and computational considerations.”
19I ignore the endogeneity of migration decisions and instead treat migration flows as exogenous. However,
this is potentially an important factor for large cities, as their labor markets attract many young people
to migrate. Such migration decisions depend on both labor and marriage markets, among other factors.
Allowing for endogenous migration decisions would unify the different local marriage markets under one
global equilibrium.
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several local marriage markets.To attain the requisite sample size to make this possible, I
pool several years of recent data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate
the model for several large MSAs.
By examining the estimated gains from marriage, I find that the marital output for a
typical couple over 30 falls twice as rapidly in the wife’s age as in the husband’s age. Specif-
ically, the partial derivative of the marital production function with respect to the wife’s
age is twice that for the husband’s age. This indicates that differential aging plays a fun-
damental role, generating asymmetric gains to marriage in terms of aging for each sex.
However, it does not appear that differential fecundity in particular is a major contrib-
utor to differential aging, although this may be due to the fact that the model does not
account for children. I also find very large differences in marital output with respect to ed-
ucation. College graduates experience much higher gains from marriage, rationalizing their
high marriage rates. This finding is consistent with other work on the marriage outcomes of
different educational classes. By comparison, differences between races are relatively small,
although minorities without college degrees experience substantially lower gains from mar-
riage at later ages. This suggests that the lower marriage rates of minorities are primarily
due to their large sex ratio imbalances.
1.3 Contribution to literature
This paper makes several contributions to the literatures that study marriage choice. First,
I document a number of facts about male and female marriage patterns over the lifecycle.
I show that women are more likely than men to enter marriage before age 40, whereas
men are much more likely than women to remarry at later ages. This results in a highly
unbalanced sex ratio for older people, with single women far outnumbering single men.
Second, I make a technical contribution to the marriage search framework. In their
conclusion, Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) outline several directions for future
research, noting that “our description of matching can and should be improved by intro-
ducing aging and the life cycle in the analysis.” The present paper makes a key step in this
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direction, by extending the marriage search framework to allow for agent types to evolve
through aging.20 With an aging process, my model can capture the lifecycle dynamics of
marriage timing decisions. For example, marriage rates for younger age groups may appear
low not because the gains from marriage are smaller at those ages, but because the value of
search is larger due to having a longer horizon over which to enjoy the gains from marriage.
Additionally, the model accounts for the equilibrium effects arising from coordination on
marriage timing — search is valuable when there are plentiful opportunities to meet other
singles, but not so much once most people in the relevant age group have married off. As
people within a given age cohort marry off and the pool of singles shrinks, the value of be-
ing single and searching falls. Anticipating this, singles become more willing to marry in
the present, to avoid being “left on the shelf”.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature that investigates sex differences in mar-
riage timing, divorce and remarriage, and the consequences of differential fecundity. I esti-
mate the gains from marriage for each age pair, which provides insight into how changing
gains from marriage over the lifecycle affect the marriage market equilibrium. I find that
female aging reduces marital output about twice as much as male aging does, providing em-
pirical support for the differential aging hypothesis. However, I do not find any evidence
that this difference is driven by differential fecundity, although this effect may be masked
due to a limitation of the model. I also incorporate education and race as agent types into
the matching model, and find that college graduates experience exceptionally large gains
from marriage, whereas race plays only a minor role. This rationalizes the much higher mar-
riage rates of college graduates, and suggests that sex ratio imbalances are an important
factor in explaining the lower marriage rates of minorities. Finally, by performing my esti-
mation at the local marriage market level, I account for the fact that different cities have
different marriage market equilibria. By doing so, I obtain more credible model estimates
as compared to the existing literature which typically assumes a single national marriage
20Existing applications of the Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) framework treat agent types as
static and ignore aging. In these models, agents are ageless but may randomly die, e.g., Shin (2014) or
Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017a). Other marriage search models such as Wong (2003a) and Coles and
Francesconi (2017) do likewise.
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market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 explores the lifecycle marriage
patterns of men and women and discusses the literature on the topic. Chapter 3 introduces
the lifecycle search model of marriage. Chapter 4 develops the identification strategy and
derives the non-parametric estimation of the model primitives. Chapter 5 discusses the
estimation results. Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Data and Facts
Figure 2.1 displays marriage rates by age for first marriages and remarriages. The top
panel shows that women have much higher first marriage rates up until their mid-30s,
after which the gap closes. The bottom panel shows that men have higher remarriage rates,
with a substantial gap that remains stable after the age of 30. Taken together, this means
that women marry at younger ages (necessarily to older men than themselves on average),
whereas men marry later and have much greater success in remarriage.
Another point to note is that, although male remarriage rates are decisively higher, male
first marriage rates remain lower until the age of 54. The gap does narrow substantially
starting around age 30, and rates even equalize in the latter half of the 30s. All else equal,
a higher male remarriage rate necessitates a lower male first marriage rate as a matter
of accounting: there is a fixed supply of single women available to marry, and so male
remarriages must displace some male first marriages. The fact that men remarry more
than women indicates that there is some serial polygyny in the marriage market, with
some men marrying and remarrying multiple times and some men marrying late or not
at all. This reflects a general principle from evolutionary biology: in mammals, the womb
is the limiting factor in producing offspring and so fecund females are a scarce resource.
As such, males compete to mate with (relatively scarce) fecund females, and so the fittest
13
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Figure 2.1: First marriage and remarriage rates by sex
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males will get to reproduce more while some other males will not reproduce at all.21 In
this case, the least marriageable men will be crowded out of the marriage market by more
desirable divorced men who marry multiple times.
Aside from differential mortality or migration, the only way that there can be a gap in
remarriage rates is if divorced men disproportionately get remarried to previously never-
married women. Figure 2.2 shows that, at every age, remarriages for men are more likely
to involve a wife entering her first marriage than vice versa.
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Notes: The age axis denotes the age of the person getting remarried. ACS 2010–2014.
Figure 2.2: Proportions of remarriages to previously never-married spouse
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the population and of singles in the four largest
marriage markets. Each of these MSAs sees a similarly sharp decline in the number of
singles from ages 25 to 35, which levels out at around age 40. The population sex ratio is
most skewed in New York City, with women outnumbering men at every age above 24 and
the gap widening further at later ages. For singles, each MSA follows the same overall sex
21Trivers (1972) explains how differential parental investment in offspring governs the mating strategies
of males and females. Female animals typically invest far more in the production of offspring, such as by
producing eggs or gestating offspring in the womb. As such, females face a higher opportunity cost in the
choice of whom to mate with. As a result, they are much more selective than males, whose opportunity cost
is practically negligible.
For species in which males do not make any parental investment, e.g., the lion or the hippopotamus,
extreme polygyny is the rule — females will all seek to mate with the best available male. The females often
live in a group along with this “alpha” male, and all other adult males are excluded. The alpha male is
replaced when another male challenges and defeats him.
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ratio pattern: single men outnumber single women at every age below 35, but past age 40,
the number of single men drops below the number of single women. At later ages, the sex
ratio among singes becomes severely imbalanced, approaching a 2:1 ratio. Not only does
the difference in counts widen dramatically, but the sex ratio is further amplified because
the supply of singles (the denominator) is much smaller by that age.22 This reflects the two
patterns observed in Figure 2.1: women marry earlier than men, but older men remarry
more and are thus less likely to be single.23
Taken together, these facts strongly suggest that, as they grow older, men enjoy greater
success in the marriage market than do women. Male remarriage also contributes to the
relatively higher female first marriage rates. If divorced men are getting remarried to
younger, never-married women, this increases the first marriage rate for these younger
women and decreases the remarriage rate for older women as well as the first marriage rate
for the young men who are “crowded out”. Another consequence of favorable remarriage
opportunities for men is that married men have better outside options, which improves their
bargaining position within marriage, and plausibly induces more divorce on the margin.
As such, as women age, they not only face a tighter remarriage market, but their share of
marital output shrinks as well.
In addition to the concerns about poverty among single mothers, there is another reason
to worry about the worse marriage market opportunities of older women. Women face a
more exacting tradeoff between family and career, and typically reduce their work hours
for several years in order to allocate more time to raising their children. The result is that
mothers gain less experience and human capital, resulting in lower earnings relative to their
husbands. In the event of divorce, mothers often take custody of their children, further
adding to their financial burden.
Bronson (2015) argues that women anticipate this and factor it into their career deci-
22Note that the overall population drops sharply past age 50. This drop is driven mainly by married couples
leaving the city — the married populations shrink almost at almost double the rates of the single populations.
23These sex ratio patterns also hold when the population is segmented by education and race. Figures F.2
to F.5 in Appendix F show the population distributions by college attainment and race. Though there are
differences between education and race groups, the qualitative pattern still holds, with many more women
being single at later ages.
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Figure 2.3: Population distribution in largest MSAs
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sions in two ways. First, women are more likely to get a college degree, she argues, as a
form of insurance against very low earnings in case of divorce. Second, these women dispro-
portionately select into more flexible but lower-earning majors such as education or nurs-
ing, as opposed to engineering or business. This way, they can more easily manage both
motherhood and career. And by not leaving the workforce to raise children, these mothers
can rely on their careers to provide for themselves in the event of a divorce. Poor remar-
riage prospects only amplify this mechanism, as the option to remarry for financial support
becomes less viable. By this line of reasoning, weaker remarriage prospects for women con-
tribute to the gender gaps in higher education and occupational choice.
Below, I explore several plausible explanations for why men gain this advantage on the
marriage market from their 30s onward. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and
there is likely to be some interplay between them.
2.1 Motherhood and children
The fact that mothers typically take custody of their children after divorce could poten-
tially explain why women are less likely to remarry. First, it could simply be that divorced
mothers are busy with both work and taking care of their children, and do not have as
much time for dating. Second, the prospect of step-parenthood may reduce their desirabil-
ity as prospective spouses, as men may prefer to raise their own biological offspring. For
obvious evolutionary reasons, animals are well-adapted to avoid investing resources in ge-
netically unrelated offspring.24 By this line of reasoning, the presence of step-children may
substantially reduce the marital surplus as compared to couples raising their own biological
offspring.
However, it is simply not the case that motherhood reduces marriage rates — Figure 2.4
shows that, among divorced women, mothers are actually more likely to remarry up until
their mid-forties, and are no less likely to remarry thereafter. This could be because single
24A standard reference is Trivers (1972), which outlines the evolutionary pressures that determine parent-
ing behavior in sexually-reproducing species.
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Figure 2.4: Female remarriage rates by motherhood status
mothers are more willing to get married or remarried. It could also be due to selection into
motherhood — the more desirable women may be disproportionately represented among
mothers. In any case, motherhood cannot be generating the remarriage gap.
2.2 Differential aging
Several papers have sought to explain the marital age gap — the fact that husbands are on
average older than their wives — as a product of the shorter female reproductive horizon.
Two such papers are Siow (1998) and Dı́az-Giménez and Giolito (2013). By taking repro-
duction as the impetus for marriage, these models show how differential fecundity results
in an equilibrium in which husbands are older than their wives. The underlying mechanism
is that female desirability (in this case, fecundity) depreciates more rapidly with age than
does that of males. Bronson and Mazzocco (2018) incorporate this mechanism into their
marriage market model by allowing marriage only for young women but imposing no such
restriction on men.
Low (2015) provides experimental evidence demonstrating that men care about fecun-
dity directly (independently of age) in the dating market, and shows how women face a
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tradeoff between marriage and career because of their depreciating reproductive capital.
Related to this idea, Dessy and Djebbari (2010) show how a coordination failure between
younger and older women on the marriage market penalizes women who postpone marriage
to focus on their careers.
Differential aging may also occur at the transition to adulthood — the sexes may mature
at different rates in terms of their readiness for marriage. If men mature later in terms
of their suitability for marriage and fatherhood, then young women who are ready for
marriage will look to date older, more mature men. This could be due to mens’ psychological
disposition and/or to their ability to earn to support a family. Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka
(2016) allow for aging and age preferences in their marriage market model, and finds that
women mature earlier than men in terms of their desirability in the marriage market. Their
desirability also starts to decline at an earlier age than that of men.
To illustrate the differential aging mechanism, consider a simple matching model in
which there are two traits, beauty and wealth. Suppose that men care more about beauty
and women care more about wealth in their prospective spouses. Further suppose that
wealth is non-decreasing in age, while beauty is strictly decreasing in age. Under these
conditions, though aging reduces both mens’ and womens’ value on the marriage market,
women face a greater age penalty because of mens’ greater attention to beauty. In contrast,
mens’ value fares less badly (or even better) with age because of the wealth bonus as well as
a smaller age penalty. As such, older men are better able to compete against young men for
marriages to young women. Thus, older men will have higher marriage rates than women
of the same age. Along these lines, Coles and Francesconi (2011) develop an equilibrium
search model in which mate value depreciates over time, but there is also a countervailing
career incentive to delay marriage. This leads to an equilibrium with matching between
older high earners and younger low earners.
This differential aging mechanism can explain how sex differences in marriage rates will
change with age. It predicts that, because of the greater female age penalty, older women will
face more intense competition from younger women (whereas the reverse occurs for men),
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and hence female marriage rates will start to decline at earlier ages than male marriage
rates. Thus, female marriage rates will peak and decline earlier than male marriage rates.
Male marriage rates will not be as high at their peak, but will decline less steeply with age.
2.3 Equilibrium sorting in the marriage market
Marriage market equilibria can be dramatically affected by imbalances in the populations
of men and women. In a recent popular book, Birger (2015) provides numerous examples
of how imbalanced sex ratios can have outsized impacts on dating culture and marriage
markets in settings ranging from cities to college campuses to religious communities.25
These examples illustrate that supply and demand quite literally rule the marriage market,
and so it is critical that any empirical study of marriage account for such equilibrium
sorting. Equilibrium sorting under a relative shortage of men can also generate the marriage
and remarriage patterns observed in Figure 2.1. If more women than men are seeking to
marry, then men will enjoy greater success in the marriage market, by the logic of supply
and demand. Such a situation could arise because of factors that remove men from the
marriage market, such as migration, mortality, and incarceration. In China, the reverse has
occurred — the One Child Policy has led to an extreme shortage of girls in some areas (due
to a cultural preference for boys and the widespread practice of selective abortions). Bride
prices — customary gifts of money and property from the groom’s family to the newly-wed
couple — have skyrocketed due to the sex ratio imbalance in the marriage market.26
A number of papers have found large effects of marriage market sex ratios on female
marital outcomes.27 Guttentag and Secord (1983) argues that the post-WWII Baby Boom
25The book discusses at length the difficulties of dating for women (and the advantages for men) in New
York City and contrasts it with West Coast cities such as Seattle and San Jose to illustrate how sex ratio
imbalances affect peoples’ dating experiences. Another interesting example covered is the dating cultures
of college campuses with large sex ratio imbalances, at both ends of the spectrum. Not surprisingly, long-
term monogamous relationships are the norm when women are scarce, and short-term encounters are more
typical when men are scarce.
26For example, “A distorted sex ratio is playing havoc with marriage in China” (2017) reports that in
the province of Shandong, which lies between Beijing and Shanghai, the sex ratio reached 123:100 in 2010.
Local bride prices have increased 100-fold in some villages there over the past ten years.
27For example, Angrist (2002) studies marriage among immigrant populations, exploiting the fact that
most marriages were within ethnic groups. Another example is Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos
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caused a “marriage squeeze”28 for women in that birth cohort, which in turn was a fun-
damental driver of the many social upheavals of the 1960s, as women were driven by poor
marriage prospects to pursue independence from marriage. Bronson and Mazzocco (2018)
use an overlapping-generations model of marriage search to capture this cohort-size effect
and finds that it can explain most of the variation in marriage rates since the 1930s. A
similar paper is Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka (2016), which also estimates an overlapping-
generations model of marriage search to show that changes in demographics, via their effect
on sex ratios, can almost perfectly explain the observed changes in marriage rates from 1870
to 1950.
Moreover, even if enough men are physically present, many are considered unmarriage-
able due to chronic unemployment, mental illness, substance abuse, crime, etc. This is the
hypothesis advanced by Wilson (1987), who argued that the low marriage rates of black
women are attributable to the poor labor market prospects of black men. By the same to-
ken, Lundberg and Pollak (2007) note in their review of American marriage trends that “the
deteriorating market prospects of less-educated men during the 1980s and 1990s may have
played a role in increasing nonmarital childbearing”. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, et al. (2017)
apply this logic to study how male employment prospects affect female marriage and child-
bearing patterns. They find that trade shocks which negatively impacted male employment
in manufacturing decreased the prevalence of marriage among women; conversely, negative
shocks to female employment increased the prevalence of marriage among women.
In this case, the least marriageable men may not be able to marry at all, as women
will opt to marry older divorced men in their stead. By virtue of the fact that they were
considered suitable for marriage in the first place, divorced men will tend not to be among
the least desirable men. Thus, a group of the least marriageable men will not marry at all,
while other men will marry multiple times. This “serial polygyny” equilibrium generates
(2011), which uses local variation in mortality from WWI in France to identify the effect of sex ratios on
marriage outcomes.
28When combined with a marital age gap, sudden changes in cohort size result in sex ratio imbalances.
An increase in cohort size leaves the women in that cohort facing a relative shortage of men in the cohorts a
few years older than them. Similarly, a decrease in cohort size leaves the men in that cohort facing a relative
shortage of women in the cohorts a few years younger than them.
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Figure 2.5: Male income by ever-married status
both a lower first marriage rate and a higher remarriage rate for males, as observed in the
data. Figure 2.5 shows that, by middle age, married men earn almost twice as much as
never married men. Of course, some of this difference in earnings is due to endogenous
choices such as working harder to support a family. However, it is hard to believe that
selection into marriage does not play a substantial role in generating this difference. As
income is an important factor in a man’s desirability as a husband, women will consider
marrying higher-earning divorced men rather than lower-earning never-married men.
Sex ratio imbalances can also be concentrated within groups when members prefer to
marry within the group. An unusually clear example of this is provided by minority religious
groups. Birger (2015) notes that the sex ratio among Mormons in Utah is 100:150, despite
the fact that the state of Utah has more men than women overall. The reason for this is
that Mormon men have been leaving the church at far higher rates than women over the
past three decades. This has made dating very competitive for Mormon women, who face a
race against time to get married before their age makes them uncompetitive in the marriage
market. More generally, sex ratio imbalances within groups affect marriage rates in the
expected way. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show overall marriage rates by college attainment and
race. Figure F.1 in Appendix F shows the overall marriage rates by urban status. In each
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Figure 2.6: Marriage rates by sex and education
24
A
sian
B
lack
W
hite
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0.10
Age
M
ar
ri
ag
e
ra
te
(a
nn
ua
l)
Sex Female Male
Notes: The marriage rate is the proportion of all singles who enter into marriage during
the survey year. ACS 2008–2014.
Figure 2.7: Marriage rates by sex and race
25
case, women have relatively higher marriage rates at younger ages and men have relatively
higher marriage rates at later ages. But the variation between groups is highly suggestive
of the effects of a sex ratio imbalance — the marriage rate gap between men and women at
later ages is far larger among groups in which there are relative shortages of men: college
graduates, blacks, and urban populations.29
My equilibrium model of the marriage market takes account of the populations of men
and women by age as well as by education and race. This allows it to capture the com-
plexities of matching across these dimensions. Education acts as a proxy for income and
marriageability more generally. I also estimate my model at the local level in order to cap-
ture the relative suppy and demand conditions of different marriage markets, arising from
heterogeneity of their populations.
2.4 Other hypotheses
Finally, it could be that women have close substitutes for husbands (and men do not have
close substitutes for wives). Single mothers often qualify for welfare benefits. In the case
of divorce, a woman may receive alimony and/or child support payments from her ex-
husband. These income sources relieve the financial burden that would otherwise increase
the incentive for single women to marry.
Another anecdotal story is that older women simply have less to gain from marriage.
However, this story is confounded by marital opportunities — if the quality of men willing
to marry them is too low, women will forgo these low-value marriages and will correctly
state that it is because they do not have much to gain from such marriages.
29As noted above, women complete college at much higher rates than men, a gap that has widened
since women surpassed men in the 1980s. This is directly visible in the population supplies of people
with and without college degrees (compare Figures F.2 and F.3 for non-minorities, or Figures F.4 and F.5
for minorities). The sex ratio imbalances within educational classes are especially pronounced for younger
generations: there are far more college-educated women than men in these cities, and far more men than
women among those without a college degree. The same pattern holds for race, with there being relatively
fewer men among minorities. In combination, this results in quite extreme sex ratio imbalances for college-
educated minorities (Figure F.4).
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Chapter 3
Model
The marriage market is represented by an equilibrium search and matching model which
features overlapping generations and an aging process. The model builds on the equilib-
rium search-bargaining model of Shimer and Smith (2000) and the extensions of Goussé,
Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) and Goussé (2014). In particular, the model bears greatest
resemblance to that of Goussé (2014), and as the notation imposed by the aging process
can be cumbersome, I refer the reader to Appendix D for a brief review of that model.
These models rely on the assumption steady state equilibrium for identification as well
as solution. In particular, this simplifies the problem of agent expectations about future
states of the marriage market. As populations of singles are unchanging, agents need not
forecast the future to form expectations.
3.1 The marriage market
Consider a single marriage market. There are continuua of men and women who search
randomly for matches in continuous time. People discount the future at a common rate r.
Each person is fully characterized by their age and a type vector. Throughout, I adhere to
the following notation for functions of individual and couple ages and type vectors:
1. Sex (m, f): subscript
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2. Age (e.g., a, b): superscript
3. Type vector (e.g., x, y): function arguments
In the text, I sometimes use tuples to refer to age-type combinations, e.g., (a, x) men or
(b, y) women. As the sexes are symmetric in the model, I present the equations for males
and omit the female cases for the sake of brevity.
3.1.1 Populations
Denote the male and female population measures by `am(x), `
b
f (y), the singles measures by
uam(x), u
b
f (y), and the measures of married couples by m
a,b(x, y). Note that these are not
probability distributions (i.e., they are not normalized). As such, the model allows for
global sex ratio imbalances. Denote the total measures of males and females by Lm :=∑
a
∫
`am(x)dx and Lf :=
∑
b
∫
`bf (y)dy. Similarly, denote the total measures of singles
by Um :=
∑
a
∫
uam(x)dx and Uf :=
∑
b
∫
ubf (y)dy. Men and women have different life
expectancies, and die at age- and type-dependent Poisson rates ψam(x), ψ
b
f (y).
The marriage market can be considered as a closed system with population inflows and
outflows only from birth and death. It is also simple to allow for exogenous migration flows,
though I do not model this at the individual level — people make decisions as if they will
never migrate. Allowing for population-level migration flows helps the model to fit lifecycle
migration patterns in the empirical application (e.g., young people migrating into and old
people emigrating out of cities). Birth and migration are exogenous and the inflows of
new people are denoted by γam(x), γ
b
f (y). People migrate out of the marriage market at
exogenous rates ϕam(x), ϕ
b
f (y). Also denote couple-specific migration inflows by γ
a,b(x, y)
and the couple-specific outflow rate by ϕa,b(x, y).
3.1.2 Stochastic aging
Although types are static, people proceed sequentially through discrete ages 1, . . . , T by
means of exogenous stochastic aging shocks. Stochastic aging is the most natural and
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tractable way to incorporate an aging process into the search model. This way, there is
no need to keep track of time as a state variable, as aging shocks are treated as Poisson
arrivals along with other stochastic events such as meetings and death.30 An alternative
approach is to use a deterministic continuous aging process, as in Coles and Francesconi
(2011), but this makes the model much harder to solve.31 I denote age separately from the
type vector to make clear that it is a dynamic state variable.
Let ρ be the Poisson arrival rate of aging shocks. Each arrival increments a person’s age
by 1. In the terminal age category T , aging stops (but everyone dies eventually because of
arrivals of death shocks). I assume that, for a married couple, aging shocks are perfectly
correlated, so that the pair ages together in lock-step.
3.1.3 Meeting technology
Single men and women meet one another at random through a frictional search process.
There is no search within marriage. Meetings are modeled as stochastic Poisson arrivals,
and meeting rates may differ based on types. I follow the approach of Shin (2014), whose
model features race-specific meeting rates, which she uses to separately identify marital
preferences and dating opportunities with data on interracial marriage patterns. Here,
meeting rates are allowed to vary by the ages or types of each pair. This reflects the fact
that people may be more likely to meet others of similar age, race, and education.
The flow rate of meetings between single (a, x) men and single (b, y) women is given by
Ma,b(x, y) := ξa,b(x, y)M (Um, Uf )
uam(x)
Um
ubf (y)
Uf
,
30Poisson events are a convenient distribution for events in stationary continuous-time models because
inter-arrival durations are exponentially distributed. The exponential distribution is the only memoryless
continuous distribution, which means that the distribution of waiting times is independent of how much
time has already elapsed. Without memorylessness, it would be necessary for agents to keep track of time
as a state variable.
31By using a constant rate of aging, this method also circumvents the need to track time as a state variable.
See Appendix E for an overview of the model with a continuous aging process and the difficulties that arise
in solving it.
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where M is assumed to be a CRS32 meeting technology. In the application, I use
M(Um, Uf ) :=
√
UmUf .
Here, M (Um, Uf ) can be interpreted as the overall rate of meetings in the marriage market,
which is rescaled by ξa,b(x, y) to reflect differing efficiencies in generating meetings between
types. These meetings are distributed among the different pairs of types according to their
share of the singles population: u
a
m(x)
Um
ubf (y)
Uf
.
Define the meeting function λa,b(x, y) as the flow of meetings per unit of time divided
by the total number of potential meetings between (a, x) men and (b, y) women. In other
words, λa,b(x, y) is the meeting rate: the fraction of potential meetings that are realized per
unit of time. Formally,
λa,b(x, y) = λa,b (x, y;Um, Uf ) :=
Ma,b(x, y)
uam(x)u
b
f (y)
= ξa,b(x, y)
M(Um, Uf )
UmUf
.
Thus, the flow of meetings between (a, x) men and (b, y) women can be written as
Ma,b(x, y) = λa,b(x, y)uam(x)u
b
f (y).
For an (a, x) man, the arrival rate of meetings with (b, y) women is
Ma,b(x, y)
uam(x)
= λa,b(x, y)ubf (y),
and so the arrival rate of meetings with any woman is
1
uam(x)
∑
b
∫
Ma,b(x, y)dy =
∑
b
∫
λa,b(x, y)ubf (y)dy.
The fact that M is a CRS technology means that, for an unmarried person, the rate at
which meetings arrive is invariant to the total number of singles in the marriage market,
32CRS meeting technology is also used in Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b).
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i.e., doubling the number of single men and women has no effect on the meeting rates
experienced by individuals. Rewriting the expression for λa,b(x, y)ubf (y), it is easy to see
that it is homogenous of degree 0 in the singles population: ∀t > 0,
ξa,b(x, y)
M((tUm), (tUf )
(tUm)(tUf )
(tubf (y)) = ξ
a,b(x, y)
tM(Um, Uf )
t2UmUf
tubf (y)
= ξa,b(x, y)
M(Um, Uf )
UmUf
ubf (y)
≡ λa,b(x, y)ubf (y).
Clearly, this also holds when integrating over all ages and types of women, which gives the
total rate of meetings.
Intuitively, this means that singles are able to meet one another at the same rate,
regardless of how many singles there are in the market. This makes sense for the obvious
reason that people are time-constrained in how many other people they can meet, and this
constraint is certainly binding for almost everyone living in a moderately populated city. In
other words, the local population size is not the limiting factor of the number of meetings
a person can realize.
With CRS meeting technology, sex ratios alone determine the meeting rate experienced
by individuals. However, for meetings with singles of a specific type, the relative population
share of that type does matter. With the total number of singles held fixed, an (a, x)
man meets (b, y) women at rate λa,b(x, y)ubf (y), i.e., at a rate proportional to the share of
(b, y) women in the singles population. So, even though the matching technology is CRS
with respect to the overall population of singles, it is quadratic with respect to the relative
shares of singles by type.
As such, there is a matching externality: when a (b, y) woman gets married, the relative
share of (b, y) singles, ubf (y)/Uf , shrinks, reducing the rate at which men meet them (though
this is offset by more meetings with other types whose relative shares necessarily increased).
In particular, this can give rise to a strategic complementarity in marriage timing. If people
prefer to match with someone of similar age, then there is an incentive to coordinate on
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marriage timing. Those who postpone marriage for too long will find that meetings with
other singles their age are hard to come by, as most of their meetings will be from the more
plentiful group of younger singles.
3.1.4 Marriage, divorce, and bargaining
Upon meeting, singles decide whether to marry or to keep searching. The gains from
marriage are represented by a systematic component based on the pair’s observed types,
and an idiosyncratic component representing unobserved heterogeneity in match quality. I
normalize the flow value of singlehood to 0 without loss of generality, as marriage and
divorce decisions only depend on the gains from marriage relative to singlehood. The
systematic component is modeled as a marital production function, fa,b(x, y), which is
the flow utility generated by a marriage between an (a, x) man and a (b, y) woman. The
idiosyncratic component is modeled as a random, match-specific love shock that is drawn
upon meeting, before the marriage decision:
z
iid∼ G.
There is no learning or uncertainty; when a pair meets, they observe their love shock
and make an instantaneous marriage decision. This effectively means that the process of
courtship is instantaneous.
If they marry, the resulting marital flow output is fa,b(x, y) + z. Utility is perfectly
transferable within marriage, and the marital flow output is divided according to Nash
Bargaining, with the outside options of being single and searching as threatpoints. The
assumption of perfectly transferable utility is crucial for identification of the model, as
will become evident below. This is a reasonable assumption, as there are manifold ways for
spouses to compensate one another within marriage.33
33Money is an obvious way for spouses to compensate one another; housework is another. Beyond this,
there is plenty of scope for bargaining over major joint decisions such as: family planning (how many children
to have and when), parenting (how to raise the children), where to live (close to whose family, close to
which labor market), career decisions (whether one spouse should make career sacrifices to spend more time
raising children, when to retire), etc.
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The division of the marital flow output between husband and wife is denoted by
fa,b(x, y) + z = ta,bm (x | y, z) + ta,bf (y | x, z). (3.1.1)
Married people also make separation choices. I adopt the endogenous divorce process
developed by Goussé (2014). Over the course of a marriage, love shocks z ∼ G are renewed
at Poisson rate δ, triggering a renegotiation of the intramarital transfers. If the updated
love shock is insufficient to sustain the marriage, the couple divorces. This assumption of
no commitment in marriage is largely irrelevant in the context of transferable utility. In the
model, separation decisions are always mutual, i.e., a couple will choose to divorce if and
only if they would both be better off apart. By contrast, in a model with non-transferable
utility, the assumption of no commitment would mean that there could be unilateral divorces
in which one spouse is made worse off.
It is worth noting that the love shocks are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed),
although a more realistic assumption would be that they are serially correlated. This
would be the case for many sources of unobserved heterogeneity which are highly persistent
(e.g., personality, values, habits, etc). With i.i.d. love shocks, a high realization of z may
not be sufficient to warrant a marriage, as the shock is transitory and renewals will revert
to the mean. With serially correlated love shocks, a high realization of z would imply a
more durable marriage. Hence, the model undervalues the persistence of the idiosyncratic
gains from marriage (z) and will therefore underestimate the durability of marriages that
have low systematic gains (fa,b(x, y)) based on observables. However, allowing for serial
correlation would require keeping track of z as a state variable, which greatly complicates
the model and is beyond the scope of this paper. Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka (2016) use
a simple two-state Markov process, but they estimate the model by simulation. A more
general approach would be a Markov process with a continuous state-space, e.g., an AR(1)
process (auto-regressive process of order 1) as commonly used in time-series modeling.
At every age transition, the marital output fa,b(x, y) and outside options change, and
so the couple renegotiates the division of the marital surplus via Nash Bargaining. To
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maintain tractability, I assume that marriages can only be dissolved upon arrival of a
new love shock, and not at an age transition. Due to aging, it is possible that a couple’s
marital surplus becomes negative (it must start out positive) so that they would both be
better off as singles. However, I impose the restriction that they must remain married in
this unhappy state until an updated love shock separates them.
3.2 Steady state population measures
Given birth and migration inflows, the steady state population measures in the marriage
market are derived from the condition that population inflows equal population outflows
for people of each sex, age, and type:
(ρ+ ϕam(x) + ψ
a
m(x))`
a
m(x) = γ
a
m(x) + ρ`
a−1
m (x). (3.2.1)
The population sizes can then be solved forward from a = 1, using the boundary condition
`0m ≡ 0.
3.3 Strategies
Denote the discounted present value of an (a, x) man by V am(x) when single, and byW
a,b
m (x |
y, z) when married to a (b, y) woman with realized love shock z. Define the personal surplus
as
Sa,bm (x | y, z) :=W a,bm (x | y, z)− V am(x).
The value function for a single man of type x and age a < T is then
(r+ ρ+ψam(x))V
a
m(x) = ρV
a+1
m (x)+
T∑
b=1
∫∫
λa,b(x, y)max
{
Sa,bm (x | y, z), 0
}
ubf (y)dG(z)dy.
(3.3.1)
This expression takes into account both the continuation value from aging as well as the
expected value of a potential marriage.
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When a man of type x and age a < T is married to a type y woman of age b < T , the
value function is
(r + ρ+ ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y))W
a,b
m (x | y, z) = ta,bm (x | y, z) + ρW a+1,b+1m (x | y, z)
+ ψbf (y)V
a
m(x)− δ
(
Sa,bm (x | y, z)−
∫
max{Sa,bm (x | y, z), 0}dG(z)
)
. (3.3.2)
The derivations for these value functions are provided in Appendix C. Because aging
stops once a person reaches age T , these terminal boundary cases are slightly different. I
assume that aging shocks still arrive for a couple, but only affect the spouse that is younger
than T . In other words, ages are truncated at T . For a single man of age T , there is no
longer any continuation value from aging:
(r + ψTm(x))V
T
m (x) =
T∑
b=1
∫∫
λT,b(x, y)max
{
ST,bm (x | y, z), 0
}
ubf (y)dG(z)dy.
When a man of age T is married to a woman of age b < T , the value function is
(r + ρ+ ψTm(x) + ψ
b
f (y))W
T,b
m (x | y, z) = tT,bm (x | y, z) + ρW T,b+1m (x | y, z)
+ ψbf (y)V
T
m (x)− δ
(
ST,bm (x | y, z)−
∫
max{ST,bm (x | y, z), 0}dG(z)
)
.
Finally, when a couple are both of age T , the effect of aging shocks disappears:
(r + ψTm(x) + ψ
T
f (y))W
T,T
m (x | y, z) = tT,Tm (x | y, z) + ψTf (y)V Tm (x)
− δ
(
ST,Tm (x | y, z)−
∫
max{ST,Tm (x | y, z), 0}dG(z)
)
.
Denote the total match surplus by
Sa,b(x, y, z) := Sa,bm (x | y, z) + Sa,bf (y | x, z).
With Nash Bargaining over the match surplus, if women have bargaining power β, then the
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division of the surplus can be written as

Sa,bf (y | x, z) = βSa,b(x, y, z)
Sa,bm (x | y, z) = (1− β)Sa,b(x, y, z).
Because utility is transferable, the marriage decision is always mutual: a pair marries if and
only if Sa,b(x, y, z) > 0. Using Equation (3.1.1), adding up the value functions for a married
couple yields an expression for the total marital surplus. As such, the model can be solved
without any need to keep track of the individual transfers tm, tf (the personal gains from
marriage). For a, b < T ,
(r + ρ+ δ + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y))Sa,b(x, y, z) = z + fa,b(x, y) + ρSa+1,b+1(x, y, z)
+ δ
∫
max
{
Sa,b(x, y, z), 0
}
dG(z) + ρ(V a+1m (x) + V
b+1
f (y))
− (r + ρ+ ψam(x))V am(x)− (r + ρ+ ψbf (y))V bf (y). (3.3.3)
When one spouse reaches the terminal age T ,
(r + ρ+ δ + ψam(x) + ψ
T
f (y))Sa,T (x, y, z) = z + fa,T (x, y) + ρSa+1,T (x, y, z)
+ δ
∫
max
{Sa,T (x, y, z), 0} dG(z) + ρV a+1m (x)
− (r + ρ+ ψam(x))V am(x)− (r + ψTf (y))V Tf (y).
Finally, when both spouses reach the terminal age T , the aging process ceases,
(r + δ + ψTm(x) + ψ
T
f (y))ST,T (x, y, z) = z + fT,T (x, y) + δ
∫
max
{ST,T (x, y, z), 0} dG(z)
− (r + ψTm(x))V Tm (x)− (r + ψTf (y))V Tf (y). (3.3.4)
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3.4 Matching Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium is a partial equilibrium concept which describes the best-response
(i.e., Nash) matching strategies. Taking the measures of singles as exogenously given, a
matching equilibrium is the set of acceptance rules that govern matching decisions. As
matching decisions are always mutual (because of transferable utility), there is no need
to keep track of separate strategies for men and women, and strategies can be reduced
to the pairwise decision rules, Sa,b(x, y, z) > 0. Accounting for the randomness introduced
by the match-specific love shocks z, the matching outcome is captured by αa,b(x, y), the
probability that an (a, x) man and a (b, y) woman will marry conditional upon meeting.
A match is formed if and only if Sa,b(x, y, z) > 0. In order to derive the conditional
match probability function αa,b(x, y), I first show that Sa,b(x, y, z) is linear in z. Starting
from the terminal states, Equation (3.3.4) can be written as
(r + δ + ψTm(x) + ψ
T
f (y))ST,T (x, y, z) = z + sT,T (x, y)
for some function sT,T . In other words, the average marital surplus can be decomposed into
a sum of an idiosyncratic component and a systematic component. This gives
αT,T (x, y) = P
[ST,T (x, y, z) > 0] = P [z > −sT,T (x, y)] = 1−G(−sT,T (x, y)).
This linear decomposition of S can also be done for younger ages by recursively working
backward from this boundary case. First, I introduce some notation to keep track of the
discount factors. Define
da,b(x, y) :=

(
r + ρ+ δ + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y)
)−1
, a < T or b < T(
r + δ + ψTm(x) + ψ
T
f (y)
)−1
, a = b = T.
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Define cT,T (x, y) := 1+ ρdT,T (x, y), and for a, b < T , define ca,b(x, y) recursively as follows:
ca,b(x, y) :=

1 + ρdT,T (x, y), a = b = T
1 + ρda,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y), a, b < T
1 + ρda,T (x, y)ca+1,T (x, y), a < T, b = T
1 + ρdT,b(x, y)cT,b+1(x, y), a = T, b < T.
Using s¯a,b(x, y) to denote all of the terms of Equation (3.3.3) that do not depend on z,
Sa,b(x, y, z)
da,b(x, y)
= z + ρSa+1,b+1(x, y, z) + s¯a,b(x, y).
Working back recursively from the terminal states gives the following result:
Sa,b(x, y, z) = da,b(x, y)
(
z · ca+1,b+1(x, y) + sa,b(x, y)
)
, (3.4.1)
where sa,b(x, y) := s¯a,b(x, y) + ρda+1,b+1(x, y)sa+1,b+1(x, y).
The other boundary cases are similar, as aging shocks continue to arrive so long as one
spouse is younger than T . Ages are truncated at T , but the younger spouse continues to
age as usual. For example,
ST,b(x, y, z) = dT,b(x, y)
(
z · cT,b+1(x, y) + sT,b(x, y)
)
.
Thus, Sa,b is linear in z and can be written in terms of sa,b. This yields a solution for the
conditional matching probability function, αa,b(x, y):
αa,b(x, y) : = P
[
Sa,b(x, y, z) > 0
]
= P
[
z > − s
a,b(x, y)
ca+1,b+1(x, y)
]
= 1−G
(
− s
a,b(x, y)
ca+1,b+1(x, y)
)
. (3.4.2)
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3.5 Market Equilibrium
To close the model, I invoke the steady state assumption to require that marriage flows are
balanced: outflows equal inflows for every kind of marriage. The resulting steady state
is called a market equilibrium. Whereas a matching equilibrium is a partial equilibrium
concept that treats the state of the marriage market as exogenous, a market equilibrium is
a general equilibrium concept.
Formally,
{
uam, u
b
f ,m
a,b
}T
a,b=1
solves the steady state flow condition: outflows equal
inflows for every kind of marriage,
(
ρ+ ϕa,b(x, y) + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y) + δ(1− αa,b(x, y))
)
ma,b(x, y) =
λa,b(x, y)uam(x)u
b
f (y)α
a,b(x, y) + ρma−1,b−1(x, y) + γa,b(x, y). (3.5.1)
The left hand side of this equation represents all sources of outflows from a particular mar-
riage state: aging, migration, death, and divorce. The right hand side represents all sources
of inflows into a particular marriage state: marriages, aging, and exogenous inflows. Here,
the matching probability function αa,b(x, y) is the endogenous outcome of the matching
equilibrium, which is determined by
{
uam, u
b
f ,m
a,b
}T
a,b=1
. Put another way, a market equi-
librium requires that the marriage flows implied by αa,b(x, y) are consistent with the steady
state measures of singles and marriages.
This equation is slightly different for the ages (T, T ) boundary case, as aging stops
(ρ = 0):
(
ϕT,T (x, y) + ψTm(x) + ψ
T
f (y) + δ(1− αT,T (x, y))
)
mT,T (x, y) =
λT,T (x, y)uTm(x)u
T
f (y)α
T,T (x, y)
+ ρ
(
mT−1,T−1(x, y) +mT,T−1(x, y) +mT−1,T (x, y)
)
+ γT,T (x, y).
For age group 1, the boundary conditions are ma,0(x, y) = m0,b(x, y) ≡ 0. Entry of already-
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married couples into the marriage market via aging is represented by the inflow terms
γa,0(x, y), γ0,b(x, y).
I outline a nested fixed-point algorithm for numerically solving a market equilibrium in
Appendix B.
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Chapter 4
Estimation
4.1 Data and calibration
The American Community Survey34 provides rich cross-sectional microdata on an annual
basis, from which stocks of singles and married couples, as well as flows of marriages and
divorces can be computed at the MSA level. I pool the ACS 1% samples for the 2008–2016
survey years in order to obtain a sufficient sample size for estimating the model on MSA-
level marriage markets. I restrict the analysis to the 20 largest MSAs (see Table F.1 in
Appendix F for the full list).
I estimate two different model specifications. In the first specification, agents are charac-
terized solely by their age. In the second specification, agents are additionally characterized
by their education (whether they have a college degree or not), and race (whether they are
a racial minority or not). I define the non-minority racial class as all whites and Asians, as
the marriage patterns of Asians are much more similar to those of whites.35
The model uses a stochastic aging process, with age increasing over a finite set of age
categories. As such, initial and terminal ages must be specified. For the first specification,
I set the initial age at 19 with the 18 year-old population providing the inflow into the
initial age group in the marriage market. For the second specification, the endogeneity of
34Data provided by IPUMS, Ruggles et al. (2017)
35Hispanics are also catergorized as racial minorities, though hispanic denotes an ethnic, not a racial group.
For the precise race categorization used, see Section A.1 in Appendix A
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education choices is a major concern, so I set the initial age to 26, at which point college
completion has been determined for most people. In both specifications, the terminal age
is set to 65, and everyone from age 66–79 is included in this group — this way, the model
takes account of the marriage market equilibrium for older people, which can affect marriage
market conditions for younger groups. I use actual calendar-year ages (i.e., 1-year age
groups) which gives 47 age groups (19–65) for the first specification and 40 age groups
(26–65) for the second specification. This way, the stochastic aging process in the model is
a reasonable approximation to actual deterministic and continuous aging.
The (annual) discount rate is calibrated to r = 0.04.36 I assume that men and women
have equal bargaining power in marriage: β = 0.5. As durations between arrivals are
exponentially distributed, the arrival rate parameters are simply the reciprocals of their
respective mean interarrival durations.37 Thus, the arrival rate of aging shocks is set to
ρ = 1, as each age category in the model represents 1 year of calendar time.
Arrival rates of death shocks ψam(x), ψ
b
f (y) are calibrated with mortality data from the
CDCWONDER38 database, using sex- and race-specific mortality rates. I transform annual
mortality rates into arrival rate parameters using the CDF of the exponential distribution.
Let D be a random variable for the time (in years) until death. If the annual mortality rate
q is generated by an exponential distribution with rate parameter ψ, then
q = Pr(D < 1) = 1− exp(−ψ) ⇐⇒ ψ = − log(1− q).
Although the estimation is performed separately for each marriage market (MSA), I
suppress the notation denoting the particular marriage market. Apart from arrival rate
parameters, which are common to all markets, all other objects are specific to a particular
marriage market. The marital production function fa,b(x, y), a model primitive, is estimated
separately for each market and then the estimates are averaged together to arrive at a global
36Fixing the discount rate is a standard practice in the literature. For example, see Shin (2014) or Wong
(2003a).
37If X is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate parameter λ, then E[X] = 1
λ
.
38Wide-ranging OnLine Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) (2017)
42
estimate.
4.2 Non-parametric smoothing of population measures
I first generate smoothed population measures for singles and couples from the raw counts
in each MSA. This way, α is defined for every possible pair, and the estimates are less noisy.
I similarly smooth the marriage and divorce flows, which are used to estimate the arrival
rates in the model.
I smooth stocks and flows over the age dimensions by means of non-parametric local-
polynomial regression. For individual measures such as `, u, the smoothing is applied over
age for each type and sex. I used local-linear regression with the cross-validated AIC
bandwidth described in Li and Racine (2007) to smooth individual measures. Figure 2.3
shows the smoothed masses of individuals by age in the four largest MSAs.
For couples measures such as marriage stocks m, bivariate smoothing is applied over
both ages for each pair of types. However, the cross-validated AIC bandwidth produced
insufficiently smooth surfaces for couples measures. This is because the estimation is ex-
tremely sensitive to bumpiness in the age distributions, due to the necessity of calculating
first differences along the age dimensions. As will be shown below, estimation of α requires
taking differences of the form ma,b−ma−1,b−1. Estimation of the marital output f uses the
estimated α and also requires another similar first difference. As such, the estimator of f
tends to amplify small disturbances in the population measures.
To generate sufficiently smooth measures, I use a local-cubic regression along with a
much wider bandwidth.39 Wider bandwidths provide a higher degree of smoothing, but
they also introduce bias (underfitting) because the estimator loses the ability to capture
local details. Non-parametric regression is typically done with lower-order polynomials
(most commonly local-linear) in order to avoid overfitting. But this also means that higher-
order polynomials can be used to counteract underfitting resulting from a wide bandwidth.
Considering that the measures I am smoothing are hump-shaped distributions, a cubic
39Goussé (2014) also describes requiring extra smoothing.
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polynomial is sufficient to capture this shape over a larger bandwidth.
Because marriage is strongly assortative on age, the measures of couples have a simple
hump shape that is oriented diagonally with respect to husband and wife ages. As such,
it is best to orient the kernel diagonally as well, which is done by choosing an appropriate
bandwidth matrix. Given a positive-definite and symmetric bandwidth matrixH, the kernel
function is defined as
KH (x) = |H|− 12K
(
H−
1
2x
)
where K(x) = (2pi)−1 exp(−12x′x) is a bivariate Standard Normal density and x = (a, b)′ is
a vector of the couples’ ages. As such, the bandwidth matrix acts as a variance-covariance
matrix for the kernel, allowing for it to be oriented in the direction of joint aging. Writing
this matrix as
H = h1 ×
 1 h2
h2 1
 ,
h1 is the variance and h2 is the correlation of the kernel density. In conjunction with local-
cubic regression, I set h1 based on the model specification:
1. Age-only specification: h1 = 16
2. Age, education, and race specification: h1 = 24
With education and race as binary types, there are 22× 22 = 16 possible couple types, each
of which is smoothed over the age dimensions. This sharply exacerbates the data sparsity
problem, especially for uncommon couple types, and so a wider bandwidth is warranted.
I set h2 based on the object to be smoothed:
• Marriage stocks (m): h2 = 0.98
• Marriage flows: h2 = 0.9
• Migration flows (ϕ): h2 = 0.85
These values were chosen to provide adequate smoothing without excessively underfitting
the data. With ample data on marriage stocks, I use a large kernel correlation h2, which
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places the local-regression weights mostly on couples with the same age gap (along the
diagonal), even if they are much older or younger. With sparser data on flows, I reduce the
kernel correlation h2 to increase the degree of smoothing in the direction of couples with
different age gaps, which helps to fill in values where there are no observations in the data.
Figure 4.1 shows the smoothed measures of married couples by age pair, ma,b, in the
four largest MSAs. Marriage is positive assortative on age, with the distribution closely
following the a = b line, with a slight bias toward husbands being older than wives.
4.3 Identification and estimation of arrival rates
The remaining arrival rate parameters, ξa,b(x, y) and δ, are identified from data on marriage
and divorce flows.40 Denote the annual flows into and out of ((a, x), (b, y)) marriages by
MF a,b(x, y) and DF a,b(x, y), respectively. Then,

MF a,b(x, y) = λa,b(x, y)uam(x)u
b
f (y)α
a,b(x, y)
DF a,b(x, y) = δ(1− αa,b(x, y))ma,b(x, y).
(4.3.1)
Also, αa,b(x, y) can be solved by rearranging Equation (3.5.1):
αa,b(x, y) =
(ρ+ ϕa,b(x, y) + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y) + δ)m
a,b(x, y)− ρma−1,b−1(x, y)− γa,b(x, y)
λa,b(x, y)uam(x)u
b
f (y) + δm
a,b(x, y)
.
(4.3.2)
So, with data on marriage and divorce flows as well as population stocks for singles and
couples, λa,b(x, y) = ξa,b(x, y)M(Um,Uf )UmUf and δ are identified. The key assumption that
allows meeting rates to be separately identified from marital output is that divorce decisions
are no different from marriage decisions.41 As love shocks are i.i.d. draws from the same
distribution (regardless of whether it is the initial love shock or a renewal), α represents
40Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) derives a reduced-form equation in λ and δ that can be estimated
by OLS regression using data on marriage and divorce flows by couple. See Section A.5 in Appendix A for
details. Unfortunately, my data does not allow me to link divorces back to a couple and hence I cannot take
this approach.
41This is the identification strategy developed in Shin (2014).
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Figure 4.1: Joint age distribution of married couples
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strategies for both marriage and divorce. This way, the combination of both marriage and
divorce flows separately identifies α and ξ. More intuitively, divorce flows can separately
identify α because they are independent of meeting rates.
Although the ACS has rich data on annual divorce flows at the individual level, i.e.,
DF a,b(x, y), it is impossible to determine the ex-spouse associated with a given divorce.
Thus, DF a,b(x, y) is not directly available in the data. Imputing divorce flows indirectly
(from non-divorce and death flows) resulted in poor estimates due to the noise of the
imputation.42 Instead, I develop a GMM estimator for ξ =
[
ξa,b(x, y)
]
and δ.
For moments, I use pairwise marriage flows and individual divorce flows (by age and
type) for each MSA. The pairwise flows can be computed from Equation (4.3.1). The
individual divorce flows are obtained by integrating out the opposite sex from the pairwise
divorce flows:
DF am(x) =
T∑
b=1
∫
DF a,b(x, y)dy.
I weight each pairwise marriage flow moment by
wa,b(x, y) :=
`am(x)`
b
f (y)
LmLf
,
the proportional representativeness of that pair of types (within a given MSA).43 The indi-
vidual divorce flow moments are weighted by the population proportion of each type, e.g.,
wa(x) := `am(x)/Lm.
To account for the fact that divorce flows are aggregated to the individual level by
integrating over the opposite sex, the divorce flow moments must be scaled so that the
squared moment deviations for marriage and divorce flows are on the same scale. Let df
be the number of possible values for y (or the Lebesgue measure if y is continuous), so that
dfT is the number (measure) of moments summed over in computing the divorce flow for
42See Section A.5 in Appendix A for details.
43This weighting scheme is also used by Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b). Altonji and Segal (1996)
provides evidence that GMM with optimal weight matrix is outperformed in practice by equal-weighted
moments.
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any given man. Then the divorce flows are rescaled in the natural way:
dfT
(
DF am(x; ξ, δ)
dfT
− D̂F
a
m(x)
dfT
)2
=
1
dfT
(
DF am(x; ξ, δ)− D̂F
a
m(x)
)2
.
Thus the estimator minimizes a Minimum Distance criterion function (denoting the
MSA by M):
(ξˆ, δˆ) = argmin
ξ,δ
∑
M
{
T∑
a
T∑
b
∫∫
wa,b(x, y)
(
MF a,b(x, y; ξ, δ)− M̂F a,b(x, y)
)2
dxdy
+
1
2
∑
g∈{m,f}
1
d−gT
T∑
k=1
∫
wk(v)
(
DF kg (v; ξ, δ)− D̂F
k
g(v)
)2}
dv. (4.3.3)
I compute bootstrap standard errors by resampling from the raw ACS data, followed
by the smoothing and estimation steps. More details are provided in Section A.3 in Ap-
pendix A.
In practice, I do not estimate ξa,b(x, y) pointwise (for every pair) because of the high
dimensionality, though it is identified. Instead, I assume that the meeting rate is uniform
across all pairs: ξa,b(x, y) = ξ. To the extent that meeting rates are non-uniform in actuality,
this will bias the estimates of αa,b(x, y) and ultimately fa,b(x, y). Most plausibly, meeting
rates are endogenous and closely track the underlying marital productivity, as people will
focus their search where the prospects are best. This will tend to exaggerate the estimates
of αa,b(x, y), which is decreasing in λa,b(x, y), as can be seen from Equation (4.3.2). A more
manageable approach to allowing meeting rates to vary would be to estimate a parametric
functional form, but I do not explore that here.
4.4 Non-parametric identification and estimation
Once the arrival rate parameters are fixed, the other model objects can be non-parametrically
identified, following the approach of Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b). These are
solved in the following order:
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1. Conditional match probabilities: α
2. The systematic component of average marital surplus: s
3. Value functions of singlehood: V
4. Marital transfers: t; marital flow output; f .
In particular, there is no need to solve the model, as the primitives can be directly estimated
from the equilibrium conditions of the model.
As the scale of sa,b(x, y) is not identified, the variance of the distribution of love shocks,
G, can be normalized without loss of generality. I take G to be the Standard Normal
distribution function. Then sa,b(x, y) is recovered by inverting Equation (3.4.2) (adjusting
accordingly for the boundary cases):
sa,b(x, y) = −ca+1,b+1(x, y)G−1(1− αa,b(x, y)).
To recover the marital output fa,b(x, y), it is necessary to first compute the singlehood
value functions. This requires solving the integral in the value function Equation (3.3.1):
∫
max
{
Sa,b(x, y, z), 0
}
dG(z)
= da,b(x, y)
∫ ∞
−∞
max{sa,b(x, y) + ca+1,b+1(x, y)z, 0}dG(z)
= da,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y)
∫ ∞
− sa,b(x,y)
ca+1,b+1(x,y)
[
sa,b(x, y)
ca+1,b+1(x, y)
+ z
]
dG(z)
= da,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y)αa,b(x, y)
(
sa,b(x, y)
ca+1,b+1(x, y)
+ E
[
z | z > − s
a,b(x, y)
ca+1,b+1(x, y)
])
= da,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y)µ(αa,b(x, y)),
where µ(ζ) := −G−1(1−ζ)+E [z | z > G−1(1− ζ)].44 Then the singlehood value functions
44A computationally-efficient formula for µ is given in Section A.4 in Appendix A.
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can be recovered (adjusting accordingly for the boundary cases):
(r + ρ+ ψam(x))V
a
m(x) = ρV
a+1
m (x)
+ (1− β)
T∑
b=1
∫
λa,b(x, y)da,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y)µ(αa,b(x, y))ubf (y)dy. (4.4.1)
These can be solved backward from V Tm (taking V
T+1
m ≡ 0 and cT+1,T+1 ≡ 1 as boundary
conditions). Then fa,b(x, y) can be recovered from Equation (3.3.3) using sa,b(x, y) along
with the linear decomposition result:
fa,b(x, y) = sa,b(x, y)− ρda+1,b+1(x, y)sa+1,b+1(x, y)
− δda,b(x, y)ca+1,b+1(x, y)µ(αa,b(x, y))− ρ(V a+1m (x) + V b+1f (y))
+ (r + ρ+ ψam(x))V
a
m(x) + (r + ρ+ ψ
b
f (y))V
b
f (y). (4.4.2)
Finally, the division of the marital surplus into the transfer terms
fa,b(x, y) + z = ta,bm (x | y, z) + ta,bf (y | x, z)
can be recovered by using Equation (3.3.2).
ta,bm (x | y, z) = (r + ρ+ ψam(x))V am(x)− ρV a+1m (x)
+ (1− β)
[
(r + ρ+ δ + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y))Sa,b(x, y, z)− ρSa+1,b+1(x, y, z)
− δ
∫
max{Sa,b(x, y, z), 0}dG(z)
]
. (4.4.3)
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Chapter 5
Results
I first discuss the estimation results for the age-only model specification, and then proceed
to the model with education and race types. The analysis is restricted to the top 20 largest
MSAs, for which the arrival rates ξ and δ are estimated globally.
5.1 Age-only specification
The moment-based estimation procedure yields stable estimates of the arrival rate param-
eters. The estimate for the meeting arrival rate parameter is ξˆ = 2.59 (with a standard
error of 0.46). This is the arrival rate of meetings that singles experience when the over-
all sex ratio is balanced (Um/Uf = 1). In other words, singles get dates on average every
2.59−1 ≈ 0.39 years (or 4.6 months).
The estimate for the arrival rate of love shocks is δˆ = 0.0196 (with a standard error of
0.0002). This means that love shocks get renewed on average every 0.0196−1 ≈ 51.1 years.
This may seem too infrequent, but recall that arrivals are exponentially distributed, so that
a large share of arrivals have much shorter durations. For example, the probability of an
arrival within 7 years is 13%, which rises to 21% by 12 years. The median duration is 35
years. The model has to balance fitting both the marriages that dissolve early as well as
those that persist for a lifetime. A higher arrival rate δ improves the fit for the former at
the cost of worsening the fit for the latter.
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The primary object of interest is the non-parametric estimate of the marital production
function, fa,b. Consider the possible shapes of fa,b and how they correspond to differential
aging. Figure 5.1 shows three examples of what fa,b might look like.
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Notes: The dotted line denotes a = b for reference. The solid line denotes the trans-
formation a = b′.
Figure 5.1: Examples of production function shapes
In these examples, marital output is both higher for couples of similar ages and for
younger couples. The left panel shows the case in which fa,b is symmetric about the
a = b line of equal ages. This would mean that age affects the marital output identically
for men and women. The middle panel shows the case in which fa,b is symmetric about
a line a = b + k. This would mean that women are k years more mature than men — by
redefining female age as the translation b′ = b+ k, we recover the case of symmetry about
a = b′. This is a special case of differential aging: men and women mature at the same
rates, but women have a k-year head start. A more interesting case of differential aging is
when men and women mature at different rates. The right panel shows the case in which
women mature q > 1 times faster than men. In this case, female age could be redefined
as the rescaling b′ = qb to recover the case of symmetry about a = b′. Put another way,
in order for women to mature more quickly than men, it would have to be the case that
fa,b declines more rapidly in the direction of increasing b as compared to a. This is visible
in the contours of the right panel: starting from a point on the solid line, moving upwards
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(increasing wife age) results in a steeper descent than moving rightwards (increasing husband
age). In general, there will not be a linear transformation of age that makes the production
function symmetric, but these cases provide some intuition for interpreting the shape of the
production function.
Thus, a simple way to determine if men and women mature at different rates is to
compare the rates at which marital output changes in a and b, i.e., the partial derivatives
∂fa,b/∂a and ∂fa,b/∂b. This can be interpreted more intuitively as a hypothetical controlled
experiment in which the age of one spouse is held fixed while the other spouse’s age is
manipulated in order to measure the change in the gains from marriage.
Figure 5.2 shows the global estimate for the marital flow output, fa,b, obtained by
averaging the estimates from each local marriage market (see Figure F.6 in Appendix F for
the estimates in each of the 4 largest MSAs). The shape of the surface has two interesting
features. First, marital output is very low for young people but rises rapidly in the mid-
twenties. Recall that static matching models underestimate the gains from marriage for
young people, as they do not account for the value of search over the lifecycle. Thus,
even taking into account the value of search with a dynamic lifecycle model, the gains
from marriage are generally very low for young people. Second, marital output is highest
along the diagonal of similar ages, and falls off sharply with large age gaps. This implies
that age similarity is a major driver of the gains from marriage, and not just an outcome
of equilibrium sorting. Compare the marital production function to the distribution of
marriages (the equilibrium matching outcome) in Figure 4.1: the latter is much more tightly
concentrated around the diagonal. This is not surprising, however, as equilibrium sorting
often exaggerates the shape of the underlying production function.
As for differential aging, the marital output is highest when the husband is slightly older
than the wife (although this reverses at later ages). But there is no line of symmetry: the
contours bulge out more below the a = b line, indicating that marital output does not drop
as much when the husband is older than the wife. This reflects differential aging in the sense
that women mature at a faster rate: female aging reduces marital output more than does
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Figure 5.2: Marital flow output
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male aging. For example, a 36 year-old woman would be best matched with a 38 year-old
man, but starting from this point, there is a greater reduction in output from increasing
the wife’s age than the husband’s. The magnitudes of these productivity changes are more
easily seen in Figure 5.3, which shows slices of the production function where one spouse’s
age is held fixed. The curves show how the marital output for a given person varies with
the age of their spouse. In this case, when the spouse’s age is increased past the point of
maximum productivity, the rate of dropoff is roughly twice as rapid in the wife’s age as
compared to the husband’s age.
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Notes: The line for females is the output when married to a 38 year-old man. The line
for males is the output when married to a 36 year-old woman.
Figure 5.3: Marital flow output slices
Though this is evidence of differential aging, it is not clear that marital output is strongly
affected by female fecundity in particular. If it were, it would be visible as a steeper dropoff
in output as the wife age increases from mid-thirties to early forties, which is the period
over which female fecundity sharply declines. However, the decline in marital output is
not noticeably steeper in that region, which suggests that differential aging is not driven
primarily by differential fecundity. On the contrary, the effect of fecundity may be obscured
by the presence of children. As children increase the gains from marriage, this could mask
the impact of fecundity in the estimate of the marital production function. This possibility
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is discussed further in Section 5.3.2 below.
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Figure 5.4: Marital flow output for couples with a two-year age gap
Another way to look at marital output is to see how it changes over the course of a
couple’s lifecycle. Figure 5.4 shows the path of marital output for couples of various age
differences. In general, marital output increases very steeply through the twenties, peaks
in the early thirties, and remains high into old age. There is also a notable dip during the
forties, which is likely an artifact of the differences in marital output across education levels,
as will be seen with the other specification in Section 5.2.
5.1.1 Discussion
The results show that marital output declines more sharply in female age than male age.
For a typical couple in their late 30s, marital output declines roughly twice as rapidly in
female age. This provides unambiguous evidence for the differential aging hypothesis —
specifically, that women mature faster than men. As the model accounts for equilibrium
sorting, it effectively controls for sex ratio effects in order to estimate the marital output
(which is a model primitive and independent of equilibrium effects).
This model specification only accounts for assortative matching by age (and MSA), but
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there are other important dimensions along which people sort, such as education and race.
Sorting on unobservables would introduce bias into the estimation, as the equilibrium model
would be misspecified. For example, if college graduates strongly prefer to marry other
college graduates, then the sex ratio within educational classes becomes important in the
equilibrium, even though the overall sex ratio may be balanced. If the supply of college-
educated men is exceeded by the demand from college-educated women, then some of these
women will have to either marry outside of their educational class or remain single. As a
robustness check, I address this limitation in Section 5.2 below by including education and
race in the agent type vectors.
5.1.2 Other non-parametric estimates
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Figure 5.5: Value of singlehood
Figure 5.5 shows the average value functions of singlehood for men and women in the
four largest marriage markets. The option value of search is high for the young, and declines
steadily with age.45 In each market and at almost every age (except for the youngest
45There is likely some boundary bias at the youngest ages, resulting in an underestimate of the value of
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people), men have a higher value of being single and searching.46 This indicates that men
have more favorable marriage opportunities in these marriage markets. This is no surprise,
as the sex ratios in these marriage markets become ever more favorable to men as they age
(see Figure 2.3 above). With their marriage prospects improving, men have more incentive
to wait for a good match. For women, on the other hand, not only does the sex ratio work
against them, but differential aging further penalizes them for delaying marriage. Thus,
women have strong disincentives to being single and searching.
Figure 5.6 shows estimates of αa,b, the probability of marriage conditional upon meeting,
in the four largest marriage markets. Although marriage is strongly positively assortative
on age, there is also a very prominent tendency toward marriages in which the woman is
younger than the man. First of all, match probabilities are highest where women are 1–2
years younger than men. But, as with the marital output, the contours bulge out more
below the a = b line and so the match probability declines more gradually in the man’s age
than in the woman’s age. αa,b embodies equilibrium matching strategies, so it takes into
account both the marital output fa,b as well as the relative population supplies of men and
women in the local marriage market. The asymmetry is more pronounced here because the
effects of sex ratio imbalance are combined with the effects of differential aging.
5.1.3 Model fit
The model is fit to data on marriage and divorce flows: the estimator minimizes the devia-
tions between the flows in the data and those implied by the model. The estimation chooses
δ and ξ so as to best fit both the marriage and divorce flow moments. The mechanics of the
fitting these two parameters can be interpreted from Equation (4.3.2). A larger δ generates
search. This is because agents in the model who are near the age boundary cannot date people younger
than the age cutoff, whereas in reality they can and do. This makes it appear as though the value of search
is lower near the age boundary. The true value functions are more plausibly monotonically decreasing.
46Some cities have lower values of search overall. This is an artifact of the estimation procedure — the non-
parametric estimates, including the value functions of singlehood and the marital production functions, are
calculated separately for each MSA. As such, cities may have higher or lower estimated marital productivities,
which are reflected in the value function estimates. The marital production function is a model primitive
and should be the same everywhere if the model is correctly specified. To arrive at a global estimate of the
marital production function, I average together the local estimates.
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Figure 5.6: Marriage probability conditional on meeting
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more divorces, but also has the effect of increasing the flow of marriages, as α increases in
δ! This is because increasing δ increases both the numerator and the denominator by the
same amount, but since α is a probability, the numerator cannot be larger, and hence the
ratio must increase. Intuitively, marriages are less durable, and so the returns to searching
for a better match are smaller, making present matches more enticing. A smaller ξ gener-
ates fewer marriages, but also increases α, which has the effect of decreasing divorce flows.
Intuitively, meetings are harder to come by, and so the returns to searching are smaller,
making divorce less enticing.
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Notes: Solid lines indicate smoothed counts from the data. Dashed lines are fitted
values from the model. Curiously, there are consistently more female divorces in the
sample, which seems to violate the accounting identity that the total number of divorces
should be equal for men and women. Aside from the possibility of sample bias or
misreporting, this could be a result of men being more likely to relocate out of the
MSA following a divorce, or of women being more likely to move to a large MSA
following a divorce.
Figure 5.7: Model fit for divorce flows
Figure 5.7 shows the smoothed divorce flows from the data along with those implied by
the fitted model for the four largest marriage markets, the metropolitan areas of New York
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City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Dallas. The model moments exhibit a particular pattern:
they underpredict divorce for younger people and overpredict it after age 50. As will be
discussed in Section 5.3.1 below, this difficulty in fitting the overall pattern of divorce flows
is a product of the assumption that love shocks are i.i.d. as opposed to serially correlated.
In short, the love shock process cannot generate enough long-duration marriages to match
the low divorce flows after age 50, and so the estimation splits the difference by setting δˆ
to an intermediate value, where it balances the error from underpredicting divorce for the
young with the error from overpredicting divorce for the old.
Figure 5.8 shows the difference between the marriage flows implied by the fitted model
and those observed in the data, for the four largest MSAs. In these cities, the model fits
relatively well in the regions with the largest marriage flows, i.e., below age 35. Outside of
this region, the model fit is poorer, understating the marriage flows in Dallas and overstating
them in the other three largest MSAs (though keep in mind that the model parameters are
fit on the 20 largest MSAs).
5.2 Age, education, and race specification
Adding education and race as multidimensional types allows the model to more closely
capture the matching patterns on the marriage market. With two education and two race
categories, there are 16 possible kinds of matches for each age pair. This results in a data
sparsity problem, especially for types where there are very few observed marriages. To
alleviate this, I increase the smoothing parameter for the non-parametric regression of the
marriage stocks, h1, from 16 to 24.
Now the estimate for the meeting arrival rate parameter is ξˆ = 1.56 (with a standard
error of 0.12). In other words, singles get dates on average every 1.56−1 ≈ 0.64 years (or
7.7 months). This is less frequent than in the first specification, which indicates that the
model can more easily generate the observed marriage flows by accounting for assortative
mating on race and education. The estimate for the arrival rate of love shocks is δˆ = 0.0215
(with a standard error of 0.0003). This means that love shocks get renewed on average
61
Los Angeles New York City
Chicago Dallas
20 30 40 50 60 20 30 40 50 60
20
30
40
50
60
20
30
40
50
60
Husband age
W
if
e
ag
e
-0.3 0.0 0.3Error
Notes: Error is calculated as the proportional error between the model and the
smoothed data counts, with the smoothed data counts taken as the basis. Age pairs
with insufficient counts in the smoothed data are excluded.
Figure 5.8: Model fit for marriage flows
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every 0.0215−1 ≈ 46.4 years. Table 5.1 shows the estimates under both specifications for
comparison, with standard errors in parentheses.
Specification ξˆ δˆ
Age only 2.59 (0.46) 0.0196 (0.0002)
Age, education, and race 1.56 (0.12) 0.0215 (0.0003)
Table 5.1: Arrival rate parameter estimates
The results concerning differential aging do not qualitatively change; several plots are
provided in Appendix F. Figures F.7 to F.10 show the global estimates for the marital flow
output for all four homogamous type pairs. Although the gains from marriage differ by
type pair, the pattern of marital output dropping less in the husband’s age remains very
prominent. The shapes of the marital production functions for homogamous type pairs
reveal important differences. Figure 5.9 shows the a = b+2 slices of the marital output for
each homogamous type pair, i.e., how the flow output changes over the lifecycle for couples
in which the wife is two years younger than the husband. Figures F.11 to F.14 show the
value functions of singlehood for each type.
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Notes: A two-year age gap means that the husband is two years older than the wife,
i.e., a = b+2. Education types are denoted by C/NC (college/non-college). Race types
are denoted by M/NM (minority/non-minority).
Figure 5.9: Marital flow output for couples with a two-year age gap
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5.2.1 Education
There is a striking difference in the gains from marriage between education levels, mirroring
the differences in marriage rates shown in Figure 2.6. For college-educated couples, marital
output soars in the early thirties before dropping back to the non-college baseline by the
forties. In other words, the estimated model explains the much higher marriage rates of
college-educated people as the result of them enjoying much larger gains from marriage.
This sharp divide along educational class lines reflects a pattern discussed by Lundberg and
Pollak (2013): college graduates generally use marriage as an arrangement for making large
investments in their children, such as saving for their college tuition, whereas less-educated
people generally do not. As such, the college-educated are much more likely to marry
before having children, and less likely to separate than those without a college degree.
The spike in marital output coincides with the period of childbearing and raising young
children, which is consistent with the hypothesis that, for college graduates (who follow the
high-investment strategy), there is a lot of value in raising young children within marriage.47
This is perhaps because fathers want to establish their parental rights (and a high degree
of certainty of their paternity) before committing to making large parental investments.48
Moreover, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) finds that the gains from marriage have
sharply increased for college-educated women since the 1970s, and that college-educated
parents are now spending much more time with their children.
Unsurprisingly, the value of search is much higher for college graduates, especially before
the age of 35, when their marital output is very high. The value functions also reflect
47A potentially confounding factor is the labor market, which is omitted from the model. It is plausible that
college graduates face different career incentives that lead them to delay marriage until their late twenties
or thirties. For example, it may be very advantageous for a young college graduate to be highly mobile and
able to easily relocate to pursue lucrative career opportunities. The result of this is to concentrate marriage
activity into this age window. In my model, this would bias the estimates of marital output upwards in
this age window, as the model would only be able to generate those large inflows into marriage via higher
marital output at those ages. See Flabbi and Flinn (2015) for a model of simultaneous labor and marriage
search.
48Edlund (2013) posits a theory of marriage (as opposed to mere cohabitation) as an exchange in which the
wife transfers (some or all) custodial rights over her children to her husband in return for his contribution of
financial resources. As there is no market for children, men have no choice but to marry in order to acquire
parental rights.
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the effects of the sex ratio imbalances stemming from higher female college attainment,
as discussed in Chapter 2: among college graduates, men have a much higher value of
search than women. For those without a college degree, at least for non-minorities, men
and women have roughly equal values of search — for minorities, sex ratio imbalances play
a large role as discussed below.
Note however that these estimates are based on the assumption of stationarity, when
in fact there have been large increases in educational attainment over the past several
decades, especially for women. This is visible in how the population supplies in Figures F.2
and F.3 vary by cohort: the populations of college graduates have been growing with each
new cohort. This biases the estimation when education is included as a static type, and
so the results should be taken with a grain of salt. Consider that αa,b is estimated as
a first difference of the form ma,b −ma−1,b−1, from Equation (4.3.2). In a world in which
educational attainment is rising, this biases the estimates for αa,b downwards for the college-
educated (and upwards for the less-educated). Marital output fa,b is generally increasing
in αa,b, and so this bias propagates through to the estimated gains from marriage. Beyond
changes in educational attainment, any non-stationarity in the demographics of a city will
bias the estimation, which I discuss further in Section 5.3.4.
5.2.2 Race
Racial differences in marital output are more muted by comparison. For those without a
college degree, the marital output for minorities drops significantly lower after the age of
45, and slightly lower before the age of 30, relative to non-minorities. Figure 2.7 shows that
marriage rates for blacks are much lower than for whites or Asians. Seitz (2009) summarizes
the literature which finds that, compared to whites, blacks are less likely to marry, and more
likely to divorce. The fact that marital output is not much lower for minorities between the
ages of 30 and 45 suggests that equilibrium sorting is the source of these outcomes. Indeed,
the population supplies for minorities in Figures F.4 and F.5 show that there are quite
extreme sex ratio imbalances. After the age of 45, the lower marital output indicates that
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sex ratio imbalance alone cannot account for the differences in marriage and divorce. To
this point, past the age of 50, the sex ratio imbalance is at least as bad for non-minorities.
For college graduates, the overall shape of marital output over the lifecycle is very similar
by race. Due to data sparsity for college-educated minority couples, it is not evident that
there are any meaningful racial differences in the marital output.
The value functions of search reflect the relative shortage of minority men (in the large
MSAs studied herein), as discussed in Chapter 2: among people without a college degree,
non-minority men and women have roughly equal values of search whereas minority men
have a much higher value of search than minority women. It is also noteworthy that the
value of search is much lower for minorities. Given that their marital output is not much
different from that of non-minorities, this is likely an artifact of the meeting technology.
With meetings being drawn at random from the population, minorities do not meet each
other very often, which reduces their value of search insofar as they prefer to marry one
another.
5.3 Limitations
The model is a greatly simplified representation of the real world process of meeting and
marrying, and it only aims to capture the broad patterns of marriage. There are a number
of limitations which prevent the model from more accurately fitting the data.
5.3.1 Divorce process
A central limitation of the model is that the renewals of love shocks are i.i.d., which is a
very restrictive assumption. As such, a large love shock provides no basis for a durable
marriage, as love shocks are independent of one another. A much more realistic assumption
is that love shocks are serially correlated. This neatly captures the intuition that there are
many idiosyncratic factors that contribute to marriage quality, most of which are typically
unobservable to the researcher (e.g., personality, habits, values, etc.), but which are enduring
factors that can support durable marriages. As there will always be some unobserved
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heterogeneity which affects marriage decisions, modeling the persistence of such factors is
an important objective for any model of divorce.
Because of this limitation, the model has trouble matching the distribution of marriage
durations in the data. It cannot simultaneously generate enough lifelong marriages and
enough divorces, as the arrival rate parameter δ is the only means of adjusting the divorce
rate. This is visible in how the model fits the marriage and divorce flows. For example, the
model cannot simultaneously generate both small marriage flows and small divorce flows, as
happens after age 50. Small flows into marriage imply a low α, whereas small flows out of
marriage imply a high α. As a result of this tension, the model underestimates the divorce
rate for the young and overestimates it for the old.
In other words, the model generates a distribution of marriage durations (conditional on
observed types) with a thinner tail than is observed in the data. With persistent love shocks,
the model could more easily generate long-duration marriages, even with a larger value of
δ (i.e., more frequent arrivals of love shocks). The extra persistence parameter introduced
by a Markov process would be identified from data on divorce flows, as it would directly
affect the shape of the distribution of marriage durations. However, adding persistence to
the love shock process requires keeping track of the current draw as a state variable, and
so the current method of solving the model no longer works. Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka
(2016) make use of a simple two-state Markov process although they simulate their model
for estimation. Incorporating persistence into the love shock process is a significant but
crucial challenge for future research.
5.3.2 Children and parenting
Another significant limitation is that the model abstracts away from impact of raising
children on the gains from marriage. Female fecundity is surely a dominant component
of marital output for childless couples. For couples who already have children, female
fecundity is much less important; for couples who do not desire any additional children,
it is completely irrelevant. In this case, the gains from marriage may largely derive from
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raising the children together within the family unit. It could be the case that marital output
falls very sharply for unmarried childless women at the end of their fecund years, but does
not drop at all for married mothers of the same age.
My model does not distinguish between these two cases and so I only recover an overall
estimate of the marital output, regardless of whether or not children are present. The
presence of children ought to be represented in the model by a state variable so that it
is factored into the marital production function. If raising children together substantially
increases the marital output, then couples with children will be less likely to separate. Thus,
because the presence of children affects divorce flows, the marital output is separately
identified for couples with and without children.49 By estimating the gains from marriage
separately for couples with and without children, one could identify the impact of differential
fecundity and the extent to which it explains my differential aging result.
This also raises interesting questions around step-parenthood. Divorced mothers who
cannot have (or do not want) additional children may not be very desirable on the marriage
market, which could explain the lower remarriage rates for women. In fact, they may be less
desirable than comparable childless women because step-parenthood could be a deterrent to
men, who would prefer not to expend their resources raising biologically unrelated offspring.
5.3.3 Cohabitation
A potential confounder of marriage studies is the ubiquity of cohabitation as a substitute
for marriage. Much of the gains from marriage can be captured through long-term cohab-
itation, such as sharing a residence or having children. As Lundberg and Pollak (2013)
document, over the last half-century, cohabitation has gone from being very rare to very
common. However, there is an educational divide in cohabitation patterns. College grad-
uates mostly cohabit as an intermediate step on the road to marriage, but less-educated
people are to a large extent forgoing marriage entirely. As my estimation treats cohabiting
49With ACS data, the challenge lies in attribution of divorces to marriages with and without children.
It is only possible to observe children within a household, and so only the parent with custody would be
identifiable as having exited a marriage with children. The other parent would indistinguishable from a
childless divorcee as it is not observable whether or not they are a parent.
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couples as singles, the estimate of marital output is biased downward for couples without
a college-education. Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006) estimate a search model of the mar-
riage market that allows for an intermediate cohabitation stage as a precursor to marriage.
This allows the pair to learn about one another before committing to marriage. Accounting
for cohabitation allows the estimation to exploit additional information on match forma-
tion prior to or in lieu of marriage.
5.3.4 Non-stationarity
Finally, stationarity is a restrictive assumption, albeit a central one for solving the model.
The model cannot account for major demographic and social shifts such as declining fertility
or the large increase in female college attainment and labor force participation. Moreover,
with estimation being done at the MSA level, any generational demographic shifts within
cities will bias the estimates. However, given the difficulty of relaxing this assumption, it is
not clear if much progress can be made in this direction. To the best of my knowledge, every
dynamic equilibrium matching model in the literature relies on the steady-state assumption.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the sex differences in marriage patterns over the lifecycle. In
short, women are more likely to marry young, whereas men tend to marry later and are much
more likely to remarry. On one hand, these patterns may stem from fundamental differences
between men and women. If aging affects men and women differently, or equivalently, if men
and women have differing marital preferences with respect to spousal age, then observed
marriage patterns may simply reflect these fundamental differences. I call this mechanism
“differential aging”. For example, a number of papers have argued that the shorter female
fecundity window (i.e., differential fecundity) can explain a wide range of the sex differences
in marriage outcomes. On the other hand, it is also possible that equilibrium sorting could
be a contributing, or even dominant factor, in producing these sex differences. Differing
population supplies of men and women can produce sex ratio imbalances which have quite
extreme impacts on equilibrium matching outcomes.
To determine the extent to which differential aging accounts for these differences, I
develop an equilibrium model of lifecycle search and matching in order to estimate the
gains from marriage as a function of husband and wife ages. As the model accounts for
equilibrium sorting in the marriage market, it can be estimated to recover the underlying
marital output, which represents the gains from marriage. I find that the marital output for
a typical couple in their late 30s falls twice as rapidly in the wife’s age as in the husband’s
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age. This indicates that differential aging plays a fundamental role, generating asymmetric
gains to marriage in terms of aging for each sex. Thus, the lower female marriage rates at
later ages are to a large extent due to differential aging, i.e., lower gains from marriage.
However, it does not appear that differential fecundity in particular is a major contributor
to differential aging, although this is difficult to detect as the model does not account for
children.
I also find very large differences in marital output with respect to education. College
graduates experience extremely large gains from marriage compared to the non-college pop-
ulation, at least before age 40. This explains the much higher prevalence of marriage among
the college-educated. By comparison, differences in marital output between races are rel-
atively small, indicating that equilibrium sorting is the dominant factor in explaining the
racial differences in marriage rates. Minorities without college degrees experience substan-
tially lower gains from marriage at later ages, suggesting that unbalanced sex ratios do not
fully explain their lower marriage rates. However, sex ratios among minorities are still quite
unbalanced, and so policies targeted at helping disadvantaged men will indirectly help their
female counterparts by alleviating the shortage of marriageable men. On the other hand,
college graduates experience similar gains from marriage regardless of race.
I show how to identify the structural model from cross-sectional data, allowing for the
use of datasets large enough to estimate richer models. For instance, I estimate the model
at the MSA level — a much more realistic geographic delineation of a marriage market —
which allows me to capture the effects of local sex ratio imbalances on equilibrium sorting. I
also perform an additional estimation of a model specification that includes binary education
and race types (alongside age). To deal with problems of data sparsity, I employ a non-
parametric regression to smooth the data. The ability to identify marriage market models
from large cross-sectional surveys is a boon to future research in the area, as sample size
limitations tend to be the limiting factor in estimating richer marriage market models. A
promising avenue for future exploration is to incorporate major lifecycle events into the
model, such as fertility and children, education and career choice, and unemployment.
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Many of these factors have potentially large effects on the marital output and hence on
the distribution of observed marriages. Thus, there is much to learn by explicitly modeling
them.
Finally, there are two important challenges for future research on marriage markets
within the search framework. The first is to generalize the divorce process to allow for
serially-correlated love shocks. This is essential for accurately modeling unobserved hetero-
geneity in matching outcomes. By allowing for serial correlation, the model can much more
accurately fit the observed distribution of marriage durations. The second challenge is to
incorporate fertility into the model by explicitly modeling the arrival of children. Estimat-
ing such a model would allow for the separate identification of the gains from marriage for
couples with and without children. Doing so is essential for isolating the impact of differ-
ential fecundity, which would primarily be observable in the marriage and divorce patterns
of childless women.
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A Estimation details
All code used in the estimation is available in a Git repository online at https://github.
com/tobanw/search-match-age-estimation/. The dissertation branch preserves a snap-
shot of the code used in producing the published dissertation.
A.1 Data preparation
To compute population stocks and flows in each MSA, I pool the 2008-2016 ACS 1% surveys
(9 years of data) from Ruggles et al. (2017). The dataset provides sampling weights for
both individuals (PERWT) and households (HHWT) so that nationally representative statistics
can be computed (as some groups are oversampled). Anyone living in group quarters (i.e.,
prisons and mental institutions), denoted by the variable GQ, is excluded. MSA codes are
taken from MET2013. College completion is defined as having completed at least 4 years of
college, i.e., EDUC ≥ 10. This is not perfectly accurate, but there is no variable in the ACS
data indicating whether someone has earned a college degree. Race is classified into two
groups: minority and non-minority. Non-minority is defined as declaring a primary race
of white or Asian, determined from RACED.50 Marital status is determined from MARST. To
count married couples, I tally over married women, keeping track of husband attributes.
The population stocks and flows used in the model are computed in each MSA as follows:
• Population stocks for individuals, `am(x), `
b
f (y): counts weighted by PERWT
• Population stocks for singles, uam(x), u
b
f (y): counts weighted by PERWT
• Marriage stocks for couples, ma,b(x, y): counts weighted by HHWT
• Marriage flows for couples, MF a,b(x, y): marriage in the past year is determined from
MARRINYR; counts weighted by HHWT
50The Asian category is broadly defined and includes Indians as well as Middle-Easterners. The exact
categorization that I used for non-minorities is any RACED code among the following: 100-130, 400-699, 810-
826, 860-892, 910-925, 943, and 963. Anyone else is categorized as a minority.
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• Divorce flows for individuals, DF am(x), DF
b
f (y): divorce in the past year is determined
from DIVINYR; counts weighted by PERWT
• Net migration outflows of married couples, ϕa,b(x, y)ma,b(x, y)− γa,b(x, y): migration
in the past year is determined from MIGRATE1D, and the source MSA can be recovered
using MIGPUMA1 and MIGPLAC1 (but this only works in survey year 2012 and onward);
counts weighted by HHWT
These are then divided by the number of survey years used in counting to get true population
and annual flow estimates. Subsequently, smoothing is applied as described in Section 4.2.
A.2 Optimization details
For the arrival rate parameter estimation, I used the COBYLA optimizer described in Powell
(1998).51 I also supplied non-negativity constraints to the optimizer. The GMM objective
function is well-behaved with a unique global minimum, so the optimizer converges fairly
quickly.
A.3 Bootstrap standard errors
To calculate standard errors for the arrival rate parameter estimates, I performed the es-
timation on 100 bootstrap samples and computed the empirical standard deviation of the
resulting estimates. Bootstrap resampling was performed at the household level within each
MSA and survey year in order to more closely replicate the ACS sampling scheme. The
ACS is a nationally representative sample of 1% of the US population in each survey year;
the sampling unit is the household and the sampling is stratified by region.
I used GNU Parallel52 to batch process the smoothing and estimation steps in parallel
on multiple processors.
51Specifically, I used the implementation of COBYLA provided by NLOpt 2.4.2, Johnson (2014).
52Tange (2018)
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A.4 Computational details
When G is N (0, σ2), G(z) = Φ(z/σ) and
E [z | z > −s(x, y)] = σφ(−s(x, y)/σ)
α(x, y)
.
So in this case,
µ(a) = σ
(
φ(Φ−1(1− a))− aΦ−1(1− a)) .
A.5 Arrival rate parameter regression
Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017b) employ the following estimation strategy for λ and
δ. Dividing the marriage and divorce flows in Equation (4.3.1) by population stocks yields
marriage and divorce rates
MRa,b(x, y) :=
MF a,b(x, y)
uam(x)u
b
f (y)
= λαa,b(x, y)
DRa,b(x, y) :=
DF a,b(x, y)
ma,b(x, y)
= δ(1− αa,b(x, y)).
Then α can be eliminated by summing these two equations, yielding a reduced form equation
that can be estimated by OLS:
1 =
1
λ
MRa,b(x, y) +
1
δ
DRa,b(x, y). (A.1)
However, this method requires that DF a,b(x, y) is observable — in the ACS data, only
DF am(x) and DF
b
f (y) are observable because there is no way to find the attributes of the ex-
spouse. As only aggregate divorce flows are required for estimation, one possible workaround
is to indirectly infer divorce flows from the attrition in marriage stocks. Obtaining accu-
rate estimates of pairwise divorce flows DF a,b(x, y) requires very accurate measurements of
marriage stocks ma,b(x, y) in each year and in each MSA. In my case, the data became too
sparse at this level of granularity to provide usable divorce flows, but I outline the approach
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below for completeness.
Inferring divorce flows
Inferring DF a,b(x, y) from multiyear data on marriage attrition within cohorts is hypothet-
ically possible if marriage stocks ma,b(x, y) are measured with sufficient accuracy from year
to year. Within each cohort, I compared the stock of marriages in a year with the stock of
marriages in the following year, excluding new marriages. This gives an estimate of the at-
trition from marriage. After netting out expected deaths, this gives an estimate of divorce
flows.
Unfortunately, performing the regression using couples’ marriage and divorce flows gives
poor estimates of the arrival rate parameters. Figure A.1 shows the regression line plotted
against the flows data. Data points are weighted by the corresponding stock of marriages.
Note that the estimated divorce flows are very noisy and many data points are negative.
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Figure A.1: Arrival rate parameter regression
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B Model simulation
Solving the model for simulation purposes can be done by means of a nested fixed-point
algorithm. The inner fixed-point iteration finds a matching equilibrium, taking the current
measures of singles and couples as given. The outer iteration then updates these population
measures to the values implied by the matching equilibrium until a market equilibrium is
reached (i.e., the matching equilibrium generates a steady state).
Given α generated by a matching equilibrium, the singles and couples measures can be
updated by solving the system of equations given by the steady state condition of Equa-
tion (3.5.1). (Without aging, the singles measures could be computed directly by integrating
over the opposite sex.)
Given singles measures, a matching equilibrium is computed by fixed-point iteration.
Starting with an initial guess for α, compute the singlehood value functions using Equa-
tion (4.4.1). Then solve for s using Equation (4.4.2) along with the value functions and α.
Finally, use Equation (3.4.2) to update α for the next iteration.
Thus, the algorithm to compute a market equilibrium is a nested fixed-point iteration:
1. Start with an initial guess for α.
2. Use α to update u = (um, uf ) by solving the steady state flow condition of Equa-
tion (3.5.1).
3. Solve the nested matching equilibrium given u, and α:
(a) Solve Equation (4.4.1) for the implied value functions.
(b) Solve Equation (4.4.2) for the implied surplus.
(c) Use the surplus to compute the implied α from Equation (3.4.2).
4. Repeat with updated α until convergence.
The convergence criterion is that successive singles measures converge:
max{|u(k+1) − u(k)|} ≤ ε.
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In practice, the fixed-point operator is not globally contracting and the algorithm will often
get stuck in an oscillating pattern and fail to converge. This can be overcome through the
use of a damping factor to shrink the α update:
α(k+1) = 0.8α(k) + 0.2α(k
′).
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C Derivation of value functions
I will solve for the value functions as limits of a discrete time model with a small time
increment dt. In discrete time, the arrival rate parameters represent probabilities of an
arrival per unit of time. For example, ρ dt is the per-period probability of an aging shock
arrival.
C.1 Value function for singles
For a single man of age a and type x,
(1 + r dt)V am(x) = (1− ψam(x) dt)
{
(1− ρ dt)×[
dt
T∑
b=1
∫∫
λa,b(x, y)max{W a,bm (x | y, z), V am(x)}ubf (y)dG(z)dy
+
(
1− dt
T∑
b=1
∫
λa,b(x, y)dy
)
V am(x)
]
+ ρ dt
[
dt
T∑
b=1
∫∫
λa+1,b(x, y)max{W a+1,bm (x | y, z), V a+1m (x)}ubf (y)dG(z)dy
+
(
1− dt
T∑
b=1
∫
λa+1,b(x, y)dy
)
V a+1m (x)
]}
.
As all higher-order dt terms will vanish when taking dt → 0, they can be ignored. After a
bit of algebra, this equation simplifies to
(r + ρ+ ψam(x))V
a
m(x) = (1− ψam(x) dt)
[
ρV a+1m (x)
+
T∑
b=1
∫∫
λa,b(x, y)max{Sa,bm (x | y, z), 0}ubf (y)dG(z)dy
]
.
Taking dt→ 0 yields Equation (3.3.1).
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C.2 Value function for married people
For a man married to a woman of type y with love shock z,
(1 + r dt)W a,bm (x | y, z) = (1 + r dt)tm(x | y, z) dt+ (1− ψam(x) dt)
[
ψbf (y) dt×(
(1− ρ dt)V am(x) + ρ dtV a+1m (x)
)
+ (1− ψbf (y) dt)×(
(1− ρ dt)δ dt
∫
max{W a,bm (x | y, z), V am(x)}dG(z)
+ ρ dtδ dt
∫
max{W a+1,b+1m (x | y, z), V a+1m (x)}dG(z)
+ (1− ρ dt)(1− δ dt)W a,bm (x | y, z) + ρ dt(1− δ dt)W a+1,b+1m (x | y, z)
)]
.
Ignoring the higher-order dt terms, this equation simplifies to
(r + ρ+ ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y))W
a,b
m (x | y, z) = (1 + r dt)tm(x | y, z)
+ (1− ψam(x) dt)ψbf (y)V am(x) + (1− ψam(x) dt)(1− ψbf (y) dt)×[
ρ(1− δ dt)W a+1,b+1m (x | y, z) + (1− ρ dt)δ
(∫
max{Sa,bm (x | y, z), 0}dG(z) + V am(x)
)]
.
Taking dt→ 0 yields
(r + ρ+ δ + ψam(x) + ψ
b
f (y))W
a,b
m (x | y, z) = tm(x | y, z) + ψbf (y)V am(x)
+ ρW a+1,b+1m (x | y, z) + δ
(∫
max{Sa,bm (x | y, z), 0}dG(z) + V am(x)
)
.
Rearranging gives Equation (3.3.2).
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D Model without aging process
For clarity of exposition, consider the model of Goussé (2014) upon which my aging model
is based. I use notation consistent with the main text, which differs slightly from the paper.
A steady state with no population growth implies
`m(x) =
γm(x)
ψm(x)
. (D.1)
D.1 Strategies
Denote the present value for a single man of type x by Vm(x) and for a man of type x
married to a woman of type y with love draw z by Wm(x | y, z). Denote Sm(x | y, z) :=
Wm(x | y, z)− Vm(x), the personal surplus. Then the male value functions are given by
(r + ψm(x))Vm(x) = λ
∫∫
max {Sm(x | y, z), 0}uf (y)dG(z)dy (D.2)
(r + ψm(x))Wm(x | y, z) = tm(x | y, z)− (δ + ψf (y))Sm(x | y, z) (D.3)
+ δ
∫
max{Sm(x | y, z), 0}dG(z).
Denote the total match surplus by S(x, y, z) := Sm(x | y, z) + Sf (y | x, z). With Nash
Bargaining, if females have bargaining power β, then Sf (x | y, z) = βS(x, y, z). Since
utility is transferable, the matching decision is always mutual: a pair marries if and only if
S(x, y, z) > 0.
Adding up value functions for a married couple and solving for the total surplus gives
(r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y))S(x, y, z) = z + f(x, y) + δ
∫
max {S(x, y, z), 0} dG(z)
−(r + ψm(x))Vm(x)− (r + ψf (y))Vf (y).
(D.4)
Thus, S(x, y, z) is linear in z and can be written as
(r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y))S(x, y, z) = s(x, y) + z
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for some function s. Let α(x, y) be the probability of marriage conditional on meeting.
α(x, y) = P[s(x, y) + z > 0]
= 1− P[z ≤ −s(x, y)]
= 1−G(−s(x, y)). (D.5)
D.2 Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium requires that flows into and out of marriage are equal for each
type of couple:
∀x, y, (ψm(x) + ψf (y) + δ(1− α(x, y)))m(x, y) = λα(x, y)um(x)uf (y). (D.6)
A steady state equilibrium is an assignment function α(x, y) (representing strategies),
value functions Vm(x), Vf (y), and singles measures um(x), uf (y) that solve Equations (D.2)
to (D.6).
D.3 Estimation
With all the arrival rate parameters λ, δ in hand, α is non-parametrically identified by the
steady state equilibrium condition in Equation (D.6):
α(x, y) =
(ψm(x) + ψf (y) + δ)m(x, y)
λum(x)uf (y) + δm(x, y)
.
As the scale of s(x, y) is not identified, the distribution of love shocks, G, can be normalized
to fix the scale. Then s(x, y) is recovered by inverting Equation (D.5):
s(x, y) = −G−1(1− α(x, y)).
Finally, to recover f(x, y), it is necessary to first compute the singlehood value functions.
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This requires solving the integral in the value functions in Equation (D.2):
∫
max {S(x, y, z), 0} dG(z) =
∫∞
−s(x,y) [s(x, y) + z] dG(z)
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
=
(1−G(−s(x, y)))(s(x, y) + E [z | z > −s(x, y)])
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
=
α(x, y)(s(x, y) + E [z | z > −s(x, y)])
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
: =
µ(α(x, y))
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
.
Then the singlehood value functions reduce to
(r + ψm(x))Vm(x) = (1− β)λ
∫
µ(α(x, y))
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
uf (y)dy. (D.7)
Now f(x, y) can be recovered from Equation (D.4) using s(x, y) along with the linearity
result.
D.4 Computation of equilibrium
Integrating Equation (D.6) over the opposite sex yields the steady state singles distribution:
`m(x)− um(x) =
∫
m(x, y)dy = λum(x)
∫
α(x, y)
ψm + ψf + δ(1− α(x, y))uf (y)dy (D.8)
⇐⇒ um(x) = `m(x)
1 + λ
∫ α(x,y)
ψm+ψf+δ(1−α(x,y))uf (y)dy
. (D.9)
Using the above derivation, I can use s(x, y) = −G−1(1−α(x, y)) to write the integral only
in terms of α: ∫
max {S(x, y, z), 0} dG(z) = µ(α(x, y))
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
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Substituting into Equation (D.4) and using the mapping in Equation (D.5), the conditional
matching probability solves
α(x, y) = 1−G
(
− f(x, y)− δ
r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y)
µ(α(x, y))
+(r + ψm(x))Vm(x) + (r + ψf (y))Vf (y)
)
.
(D.10)
An equilibrium can be computed as a fixed point of the following mapping:
1. Start with an initial guess for α.
2. Use α to update um, uf from the steady state flow condition in Equation (D.8).
3. Solve Equation (D.7) for implied value functions.
4. Use the value functions to compute the implied α from Equation (D.10).
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E Continuous aging model
Denote the type spaces by X = [x, x] and Y = [y, y]. Agent types depreciate at rate ρ.
Treating types as “youth”, assume that young adults of types x and y enter the marriage
market at rate γ0 (and there is no other entry).
E.1 Steady state population distribution
The steady state population is given by equating inflows with outflows. Consider a small
time increment dt and the subpopulation [x, x]. The outflows from this subpopulation are
from death and aging, while the inflows are from birth.
dt
∫ x
x
ψm(v)`m(v)dv +
∫ x(1+ρdt)
x
`m(v)dv = γ0dt
⇐⇒
∫ x
x
ψm(v)`m(v)dv + ρx
Lm(x+ ρxdt)− Lm(x)
ρxdt
= γ0
dt→ 0 =⇒
∫ x
x
ψm(v)`m(v)dv + ρx`m(x) = γ0.
As this holds for every x, this equation can be differentiated:
ρ`m(x) + ρx`
′
m(x) = ψm(x)`m(x)
⇐⇒ `
′
m(x)
`m(x)
=
ψm(x)− ρ
ρx
.
This ordinary differential equation has a solution of the form
log(`m(x)) =
1
ρ
∫
ψ(x)
x
− log(x) + c0
`m(x) =
c1
x
exp
(
1
ρ
∫
ψ(x)
x
)
.
Using the boundary condition `m(x) = γ0 pins down the constant term:
c1 =
xγ0
exp
(
1
ρ
∫ ψ(x)
x
) .
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Thus, the solution gives the steady state population distribution,
`m(x) = γ0
x
x
exp
(∫
ψ(x)
ρx
−
∫
ψ(x)
ρx
)
=
γ0
x
x exp
(
1
ρ
∫ x
x
ψ(v)
v dv
) .
E.2 Strategies
Value functions are derived similarly, but they now contain a partial derivative term:
(r + ψm(x))Vm(x) + xρ
∂Vm
∂x
(x) = λ
∫∫
max {Sm(x | y, z), 0}uf (y)dG(z)dy (E.1)
(r + ψm(x))Wm(x | y, z) + ρ
(
x
∂Wm
∂x
(x | y, z) + y∂Wm
∂y
(x | y, z)
)
= tm(x | y, z)− (E.2)
(δ + ψf (y))Sm(x | y, z) + δ
∫
max{Sm(x | y, z), 0}dG(z).
The surplus, however, is no longer easily solvable. Adding up value functions for a married
couple and solving for the total surplus gives
(r + δ + ψm(x) + ψf (y))S(x, y, z) + ρ
(
x
∂S
∂x
(x, y, z) + y
∂S
∂y
(x, y, z)
)
= z+
f(x, y) + δ
∫
max {S(x, y, z), 0} dG(z)−
(r + ψm(x))Vm(x)− (r + ψf (y))Vf (y)− ρ
(
x
∂Vm
∂x
(x) + y
∂Vf
∂y
(y)
)
.
(E.3)
Using the method of “guess and check”, it can be shown that S is linear in z.
E.3 Equilibrium
The steady-state flow balance condition for marriages is now given by a partial differential
equation, which accounts for aging flows:
m(x, y) (ψm(x) + ψf (y) + δ(1− α(x, y) + 2ρ)) = λum(x)uf (y)α(x, y)− ρ∇m(x, y) (E.4)
87
This is numerically expensive to solve.
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F Supplemental tables and figures
Rank Population MSA
1 14.5 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
2 9.4 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
3 6.8 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
4 4.6 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
5 4.4 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
6 4.2 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
7 4.1 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
8 4.1 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL
9 3.8 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
10 3.5 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
11 3.3 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
12 3.1 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI
13 3.1 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
14 3.0 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
15 2.6 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
16 2.4 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
17 2.3 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
18 2.1 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
19 2.0 St. Louis, MO-IL
20 2.0 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
Source: ACS 2014.
Table F.1: Top 20 MSAs by population (in millions)
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Notes: The marriage rate is the proportion of all singles who enter into marriage during
the survey year. ACS 2008–2016.
Figure F.1: Marriage rates by sex and rural vs urban status
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Notes: Counts are smoothed as described in Section 4.2. The solid lines denote total
population counts whereas the dotted lines denote counts of singles. The y-axis is
cropped from below for clarity. ACS 2008–2016.
Figure F.2: Populations of college-educated non-minority couples
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Notes: Counts are smoothed as described in Section 4.2. The solid lines denote total
population counts whereas the dotted lines denote counts of singles. The y-axis is
cropped from below for clarity. ACS 2008–2016.
Figure F.3: Populations of non-college non-minority couples
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Notes: Counts are smoothed as described in Section 4.2. The solid lines denote total
population counts whereas the dotted lines denote counts of singles. The y-axis is
cropped from below for clarity. ACS 2008–2016.
Figure F.4: Populations of college-educated minority couples
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Notes: Counts are smoothed as described in Section 4.2. The solid lines denote total
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cropped from below for clarity. ACS 2008–2016.
Figure F.5: Populations of non-college minority couples
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Figure F.6: Marital flow output
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Figure F.7: Marital flow output for college-educated non-minority couples
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Figure F.8: Marital flow output for non-college non-minority couples
97
25
30
35
40
45
50
25 30 35 40 45 50
Husband age
W
if
e
ag
e
-4 -2 0 2Output
Figure F.9: Marital flow output for college-educated minority couples
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Figure F.10: Marital flow output for non-college minority couples
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Figure F.11: Value of singlehood for college-educated non-minority couples
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Figure F.12: Value of singlehood for non-college non-minority couples
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Figure F.13: Value of singlehood for college-educated minority couples
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Figure F.14: Value of singlehood for non-college minority couples
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